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Indoctrination and Social Influence as a
Defense to Crime:
Are We Responsible for Who We Are?
Paul H. Robinson* and Lindsay Holcomb**

ABSTRACT
A patriotic prisoner of war is brainwashed by his North Korean captors
into refusing repatriation and undertaking treasonous anti-American
propaganda for the communist regime. Despite the general abhorrence of
treason in time of war, the American public opposes criminal liability for such
indoctrinated soldiers, yet existing criminal law provides no defense or
mitigation because, at the time of the offense, the indoctrinated offender
suffers no cognitive or control dysfunction, no mental or emotional
impairment, and no external or internal compulsion. Rather, he was acting
purely in the exercise of free of will, albeit based upon beliefs and values that
he had not previously held.
Retributivists committed to blameworthiness proportionality might
support the community’s view of reduced blameworthiness, perhaps on some
version of the argument that the offense was not committed by the offender’s
authentic self. And a crime-control utilitarian might support revision of the
criminal law to recognize a defense because such a serious conflict between
community views and criminal law reduces the law’s moral credibility with
the community and thereby undermines its ability to gain deference,
compliance, assistance, and the internalization of the criminal law’s norms.
On the other hand, to recognize a defense or significant mitigation for
indoctrination-induced offenses would produce a tectonic shift in criminal law
foundations. The indoctrination dynamic at work in the brainwashed POW
case is not limited to such unique circumstances but rather is a common
occurrence in the modern world, where governments, religions, political
groups, and a host of other organizations, and indeed individuals, consciously
manipulate others toward criminal conduct through a variety of
indoctrinating mechanisms. Are people no longer to be held responsible for
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who they are? Is the criminal law now to investigate how an offender came
to have any beliefs and values that contributed to the offense conduct?
We argue that a close analysis of why some indoctrination cases are seen
as blameless while others not suggests an articulable analytic framework
based upon five key questions. We use a wide variety of real-world
indoctrination cases to illustrate the operation of this framework and propose
a specific statutory defense formulation that embodies it.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Soon after the start of the Korean War, Richard Tenneson, a patriotic
farm boy from Minnesota, volunteered for Army service in the hopes that he
could do heroic things for his country.1 Promptly taken hostage by Chinese
Communist forces, Tenneson was quickly identified by his captors as
potentially vulnerable to their well-developed “brainwashing” program.2
Through several stages of psychological manipulation, using both abuse and
reward, they effectively produced in Tenneson a true believer so dedicated to
the pro-communist, anti-American cause that, upon cessation of hostilities,
Tenneson refused repatriation to the United States.3 He and other coercively
indoctrinated4 soldiers provided a propaganda bonanza for the Communist
project, and much of their conduct constituted treason against the United
States.5
Despite Americans’ natural tendency to be outraged by treason in a time
of war, enormous public support arose for the “brainwashed” POWs, who
were widely viewed as victims of a manipulative regime, rather than as traitors
to their country.6 When the Army court-martialed the indoctrinated soldiers,
the public protested so vigorously that Army prosecutors sometimes had to
wear firearms to court and sneak in the back entrance.7 When the
brainwashing cases later fell within the jurisdiction of the Department of
Justice, the Department simply declined to prosecute out of deference to
public opinion, which it judged was likely to reflect that of a jury.8
The case illustrates a foundational problem for criminal law. While
Tenneson might have gotten a duress defense or some excuse or mitigation
for offenses committed during the abusive indoctrination process, he would
not have been eligible for such a remedy after the indoctrination had been
successfully completed because at this point he had fully internalized the
beliefs and values of his indoctrinators. Tenneson’s treasonous postindoctrination conduct was not the result of duress, mental illness, emotional
upset, or any other exculpating or mitigating condition. It was the product of
1. MATTHEW W. DUNNE, A COLD WAR STATE OF MIND: BRAINWASHING AND
POSTWAR AMERICAN SOCIETY 116 (2013).
2. Id. at 117.
3. PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW CASE STUDIES 145, 218 (West Academic
Pub., 5th ed., 2015).
4. For our purposes, coercive indoctrination refers to the process by which a
person’s values or beliefs are changed through coercive means. Thus, a defendant who
would not have otherwise committed the offense in question might claim that he acted
only because of new beliefs forcibly imposed on him.
5. PAUL H. ROBINSON, WOULD YOU CONVICT? SEVENTEEN CASES THAT
CHALLENGED THE LAW 179–216 (1999)
6. Jenell Johnson, The Limits of Persuasion: Rhetoric and Resistance in the Last
Battle of the Korean War, 100 Q. J. OF SPEECH 323, 331-32 (2014);
7. Misconduct in the Prison Camp: A Survey of the Law and an Analysis of the
Korean Cases, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 709, 756–770 (1956). Dunne supra note 1 at 117.
8. Id. at 186–87. Robinson supra note 3.
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a series of free choices by Tenneson that logically flowed from the set of
beliefs and values that were indoctrinated in him by his captors.9 If he had
been tested by clinicians at the time of his treasons, they would have found no
cognitive or control dysfunction to elicit the insanity defense, no internal or
external compulsion to compel a finding of duress, nor any other
psychological abnormality or state that might give rise to a mitigation or
excuse under criminal law then or now.
In that sense, the lack of relief offered by the criminal law seems out of
step with the public’s understanding of Tenneson’s blameworthiness. Anyone
who read the news reports of a patriotic farm boy turned traitorous
propagandist intuited a serious character shift in Tenneson that seemed to
belie the idea that the beliefs and values that drove him to treason were not his
own.10 Instead, they appeared so out of touch with his former understanding
of the world that they could only have been coercively implanted in him
through a program of psychological manipulation.
But if Tenneson did now hold those pro-communist, anti-American
beliefs and values, how could the criminal law conclude that he ought not be
held liable for what he had freely chosen to do in promotion of them? Should
the criminal law no longer assume that we are responsible for who we are? Is
it not enough for criminal liability to show that the person freely chose to
commit the offense? Must the law also inquire into how it was that the
offender came to have the beliefs and values that contributed to commission
of the offense? That, of course, would be a tectonic shift in the criminal law’s
principles of liability and exculpation. For decades, the criminal law has
established blameworthiness based on a snapshot view of the offender in the
moment of his criminal act, and not on the myriad characteristics that might
have inspired him to behave in such a way.11 An offender’s history might
have evidentiary relevance – for example, past victimizations might support
and explain an offender’s claim of extreme fearfulness – but the focus would
remain predominantly upon the individual’s state of mind at the time of
committing the offense.
One might be tempted to simply ignore the conflict between the widely
shared community judgment that cases like Tenneson’s deserve exculpation
and the criminal law’s failure to recognize any sort of coercive indoctrination
defense, especially if one is a good crime-control utilitarian. The general
deterrence message communicated by a severe sentence might be undermined
by a policy that allows for the variable characteristics of the offender to be
9. Before returning to the U.S., Tenneson told a reporter from the Washington
Post, “The reason I’m leaving China is that certain weaknesses in my character make
it very uncomfortable and impossible to stay.” Coming Home, Turncoat GI Tells
Mother, WASH. POST A13 (Sep. 13, 1955).
10. Peiping Releases 4th Turncoat; Tenneson Crosses Line Into Hong Kong
Following Two-Week Delay, N.Y. TIMES, A4 (Dec. 13, 1955); Tenneson, GI,
Turncoat, Is Back At Home BALT. SUN A3 (Dec. 17, 1955); Turncoat Yank Tells How
GIs Lived In China, CHI. DAILY. TRIB. A20, (Dec. 14, 1955).
11. See generally Paul H. Robinson, Mens Rea, Encyclopedia of Crime &
Justice 995, 995 (2nd ed., 2002).
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taken into account at the sentencing stage. For this reason, the criminal law
of the past half-century has been happy to regularly promote general
deterrence and incapacitation of the dangerous, even though those distributive
principles regularly conflict with pure, desert-based12 blameworthiness
proportionality.13 Denying a mitigation or excuse for an offense caused by
coercive indoctrination is simply one more example of how justice, at least as
perceived by the community, may be sacrificed as necessary to help fight
crime.
But more recent social science research has suggested that criminal law
rules that conflict with shared community judgments of justice can undermine
the law’s crime-control effectiveness.14 The studies suggest that a criminal
law whose rules regularly conflict with community views will lose moral
credibility with the community and as a result will increasingly provoke
resistance and subversion.15 In contrast, a criminal law whose rules embody
community justice judgments will build moral credibility and promote
deference, acquiescence, compliance, and the internalization of the criminal
law’s norms.16 As more and more diverse cases of indoctrination occur
around the globe, establishing a legal framework to treat these cases in a way
that aligns with the community’s notions of justice becomes all the more
important.17
12. By desert-based, we mean simply persons getting what is appropriate or
fitting for them.
13. PAUL H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, LAW WITHOUT JUSTICE: WHY
CRIMINAL LAW DOESN’T GIVE PEOPLE WHAT THEY DESERVE 11 (2005).
14. PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW: WHO
SHOULD BE PUNISHED HOW MUCH? 176, 177 (2008).
15. See PAUL H. ROBINSON, INSTITUTIONS OF JUSTICE AND THE UTILITY OF
DESERT chs. 7–10 (2013) (explaining that certain criminal law rules such as threestrikes laws, drug offense penalties, adult prosecution of juveniles, abolition of the
insanity defense, and the felony-murder rule, among others, seriously conflict with the
community’s judgments of justice and thereby undercut the criminal law’s crimecontrol effectiveness).
16. See id. at 177–184 (explaining that various social science studies have shown
that changes in the legal system’s moral credibility produce changes in people’s
willingness to defer to the legal system’s judgements).
17. See e.g., Colin Moynihan, Nxivm: How a Sex Cult Leader Seduced and
Programmed
His
Followers,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Jun.
14,
2019,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/14/nyregion/nxivm-trial-sex-cult-women.html
[https://perma.cc/6CWQ-V6WL]; Ruth Padawer, At 5 She Protested Homosexuality.
Now She Protests the Church that Made Her Do It, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2019,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/08/books/review/megan-phelps-roperunfollow.html?searchResultPosition=1 [https://perma.cc/QN5Q-CMZX]; BBC
Panorama, Data Leak Reveals How China Brainwashes Uighurs in Prison Camps,
BBC NEWS, Nov. 24, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-50511063
[https://perma.cc/7Y8K-X9WM]; Joe Coscarelli, 2 Women Living With R. Kelly
Denounce Their Parents and Deny Being Brainwashed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2019,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/07/arts/azriel-clary-joycelyn-savage-rkelly.html?searchResultPosition=2 [https://perma.cc/NS5C-J7HZ].
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In order to actualize the community’s intuitions, one might be tempted
to simply create a special rule for Tenneson’s unusual circumstances. There
are not many offenders who commit their offense as the result of being a POW
subjected to a well-tuned indoctrination program. But the problem with this
approach is that there are a host of more common situations – situations
involving neither captivity nor a planned indoctrination program – that can be
just as compelling in their effect in altering a person’s beliefs and values as
was the Chinese indoctrination of Tenneson.
What is the criminal law to do with such cases of informal or ad hoc
indoctrination? And what if the offender in some way volunteered for, or
perhaps just went along with, the chain of events that led to the indoctrination,
maybe with a limited understanding of where the path was leading? That is,
even if one were to recognize a defense or mitigation for offenses arising from
indoctrination, is there any practical way by which the criminal law could
draw a line that would put a workable limit on which indoctrinated offenders
might qualify for mitigation or excuse?
That is the challenge taken up by this Article. Part II reviews the
alternative distributive principles of retributivism and utilitarianism to show
that both would support recognizing some kind of indoctrination defense
albeit for different reasons. Part III illustrates the special problems that
indoctrination cases present: it is not just the extreme case of the brainwashed
POW but a variety of other sorts of cases that can be just as compelling.
Indeed, as Part IV demonstrates, there exists a host of sources of social
influence that can create indoctrination effects of one kind or another. Part V
provides some of the common examples of situations in which such social
influence mechanisms are commonly used to great effect. Part VI describes
a study conducted with law school students in which the subjects were asked
to rank indoctrination cases along a continuum of blameworthiness. It then
analyzes the students’ responses, explaining the factors that influenced their
decisions in order to determine what made some indoctrinated offenders more
or less blameworthy than others. From the results of the study and the
discussions during it, a five-part analytic framework that seemed to best
capture the judgments of the subjects is constructed in Part VII, and, in Part
VIII, this analytic framework is translated into a proposed statutory
formulation.

II. DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES AND AN INDOCTRINATION DEFENSE
Like so many other doctrines in criminal law, whether one recognizes a
defense or mitigation for indoctrination may depend upon the distributive
principle that one applies, either retributivist or utilitarian. Retributivists view
the dispensation of deserved punishment as a value in itself, requiring no
further justification. Commonly, the distribution of liability and punishment
under this principle will seek to make the extent of liability proportionate to
the extent of the offender’s blameworthiness. Crime-control utilitarians, in
contrast, see the imposition of liability and punishment as justified by its
beneficial effects in controlling future crime. We conclude that both
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retributivists and utilitarians will support some form of indoctrination defense
or mitigation.

A. Retributivism: A Taste of Experimental Philosophy
One can imagine retributivists being somewhat sympathetic to an
indoctrination case, such as that of the POW indoctrinated by the North
Koreans, under some general sense that the offense committed by the
indoctrinated POW was not committed by his authentic self and that the
offender’s later, “recovered” self is not deserving of punishment.18 Still, one
can imagine a variety of ways in which a retributivist might conceptualize
blameworthiness, and in turn, deserved punishment, and exactly how that is
done may affect just how far indoctrination is stretched as a defense or
mitigation.
The analytic method used in this project might be seen as having some
parallels to John Rawls’s process of “reflective equilibrium,”19 or at least as
being a cross between reflective equilibrium and classic social psychology
scenario-testing methodology.20 Over the course of a semester, fourteen
subjects were asked to read twenty-four real-world cases and to record on a
liability scale their view of the extent to which the offender’s indoctrination
merited some degree of mitigation or defense.21 The cases and the subjects’
views were discussed at length in seminar meetings, and over the course of
the semester the group sought to develop a principled analytic framework that
would produce the results generated by the group. Ultimately, that framework
was used as the basis for a proposed statutory formulation.
The study collecting this data, which is described in Part V, is not offered
as a reliable prediction as to the liability means that would be found in the
general population. The study lacks the methodological rigor necessary for
such conclusions.22 Instead, this study is offered to show how a group’s
18. See Michael S. Moore, Justifying Retributivism 27 ISR. L. REV. 16, 30 (1993)
(explaining that the distinctive assertion of retributivists is that punishment is justified
if it is given to those who deserve it, and a person deserves punishment only when he
has culpably done wrong).
19. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 65 (HUP 1971). Reflective equilibrium
can be broadly conceptualized as the process of working back and forth among our
moral intuitions, the rules and principles that we believe govern such intuitions, and
the theoretical considerations that influence our intuitions, revising anytime we feel
that there is incoherence among these elements. We arrive at the highest level of
equilibrium where no further consideration needs to be given to our moral intuitions
because such intuitions are comprised of judgments, principles, and theories that are
highly credible to us.
20. For an example of such methodology in the context of criminal law, see PAUL
H. ROBINSON, INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE AND UTILITY OF DESERT, Part III (2013).
21. See infra text accompanying note 107 (reproducing the liabilities scale that
the subjects used).
22. For example, the fourteen subjects were neither randomly selected nor
representative of the community but instead were simply those students and professors

2020]

INDOCTRINATION AS A DEFENSE TO CRIME

747

diverse liability judgments can effectively generate a principled analytic
framework for the criminal law’s treatment of these complex, but prevalent,
indoctrination cases.

B. Utilitarianism: The Disutility of Perceived Injustice
While retributivists might be sympathetic to the argument that those who
have been indoctrinated deserve a reduction in blameworthiness, utilitarians
may not be as persuaded by the desire to take into account the individualized
circumstances giving rise to the crimes of indoctrinated persons. In particular,
utilitarians may be likely reject the argument because a focus on the offender’s
personal ideological history undermines the law’s ability to effectively
communicate deterrent prohibitions to the wider public.23
It has long been assumed that the goals of doing justice and preventing
crime necessarily conflict,24 but perhaps these two aims of the criminal justice
system may not be so diametrically opposed.25 That is, the extent of the
criminal law’s effectiveness in gaining compliance in more nebulous cases,
such as indoctrination, through deference to its moral authority depends to a
great extent on the degree to which the justice system has earned credibility
with the citizens governed by it.26 Ultimately, whether the justice system
heeds the moral intuitions of the public with regard to those who have been
coercively manipulated to commit a particular crime presents a compelling
instance in which doing justice might actually be the most effective means of
fighting crime.
Various empirical studies have confirmed that the relationship between
the criminal justice system’s moral credibility and its ability to garner public
deference applies not just to extreme cases but to all manners in which a
community interacts with the criminal law.27 There is a general relationship
who participated in the seminar. The cases were not presented in randomized order,
nor were they presented and judged in the same sitting. Instead, the cases were
presented two or three each week over the course of the semester. Participants were
allowed to alter their judgments on any prior case, so the table represents the subjects’
judgments as of the conclusion of the seminar.
23. See Robinson supra note 11 at 9 (explaining that general deterrence
principles tend to reject excuse defenses because “any failure to punish an actor who
has violated a prohibition tends to undermine the effectiveness of the prohibition, for
it shows potential offenders the possibility that they can offend yet escape punishment
even if caught”).
24. See e.g., ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS
AND DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 2, 3 (1985) (explaining that
punishment designed as a condemnatory institution, based on the offender’s
blameworthiness, and punishment designed as a deterrence mechanism, based off of
predicted future crime, will never reach the same results).
25. Paul H. Robinson, Empirical Desert in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 29–
31 (Robinson, Garvey, & Ferzan, eds. 2009).
26. Robinson supra note 12 at 162.
27. Id. at 111–120.
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between the system’s moral credibility and its ability to gain compliance such
that even a marginal decrease in the former will produce a reduction in the
latter.28 This suggests that any system can improve its ability to gain
deference and compliance by improving its reputation for doing justice and
avoiding injustice. Several mechanisms explain this phenomenon.
First, a criminal law with moral credibility can harness the power of
stigmatization.29 Many people will avoid breaking the law if doing so will
stigmatize them and thereby endanger their personal and social relationships.
If the power of stigmatization is cheap – does not have the cost of
imprisonment, for example – and exists even if the threat of official sanction
is not present – it is enough that friends or acquaintances might learn of the
misconduct. A criminal law that regularly punishes conduct that is seen as
blameless or at least not deserving the condemnation of criminal liability will
be unable to harness the power of stigmatization.
Second, a system that has earned moral credibility with the people also
can help avoid vigilantism.30 Vigilante justice refers to occasions in which
groups of citizens unite to enforce rules and norms that they feel the legal
system is failing to adequately enforce. This phenomenon occurs most
commonly where people feel that they have been deprived of justice, that the
law is powerless to do what is just, and that the offender is deserving of
something other than the punishment he has or has not been given.31 The
disconnect between the public’s perception of the offender and the justice
system’s treatment of the offender motivates their decision to resist.
Ultimately, people will be less likely to take matters into their own hands if
they have confidence that the system is trying hard to do justice.32
Third, a reputation for moral credibility can avoid provoking the kind of
resistance and subversion that we see in criminal justice systems with poor
reputations.33 Such resistance and subversion can appear among any of the
participants in the system. Do victims report offenses? Do potential witnesses
come forward to help police and investigators? Do prosecutors and judges
follow the legal rules, or do they feel free to make up their own? In systems
with trial juries, do the jurors follow their legal instructions or do they make
up their own rules? Do offenders acquiesce in their liability and punishment,
or do they focus instead on thinking an injustice has been done to them?

28. Id.
29. Id. at 154.
30. Id. at 155.
31. Id. at 156.
32. And, as Robinson has detailed elsewhere, the danger of vigilantism goes
beyond those rare souls willing to “go into the streets”; it includes “shadow vigilantes”
– normally law-abiding citizens and officials who see the system’s failures of justice
as justifying their distorting of the criminal justice process to force justice from a
system apparently reluctant to do it. PAUL ROBINSON & SARAH ROBINSON, SHADOW
VIGILANTES: HOW DISTRUST IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM BREEDS A NEW KIND OF
LAWLESSNESS (Prometheus 2018).
33. Id.
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Finally, the most powerful force that comes from a criminal justice
system with moral credibility is its power to shape and reinforce societal
norms, and to cause people to internalize those norms.34 If the criminal law
has earned a reputation for doing justice, then when the law criminalizes some
new form of conduct or makes some conduct a more serious offense than it
had previously been, the community takes this legal action as reliable
evidence that the conduct really is more condemnable.
The forces of social influence and internalized norms are potentially
enormous. But if the criminal law clashes with people’s judgments of justice,
that conflict will undermine the law’s moral credibility and in turn reduce its
ability to harness these persuasive elements. To summarize, legal rules that
deviate from the community’s judgments of justice are not cost-free, as has
generally been assumed in the past, but rather carry a hidden cost to effective
crime-control.35 To be most effective, the criminal law should try to build a
reputation as a reliable moral authority that above all else does justice and
avoids injustice.36 In that way, it can harness the powerful forces of social
and normative influence to gain deference and compliance.

III. THE SPECIAL CHALLENGE OF JUDGING LIABILITY IN
INDOCTRINATION CASES
The Tenneson case described above provides a crisp example of the
power of a coercive indoctrination program in which captors have complete
control over every aspect of their prisoner’s existence and put him through a
time-proven manipulation regime specifically designed to replace the
prisoner’s existing beliefs and values with their own ideology.37 But not all
cases of effective indoctrination arise from such controlled, militaristic
conditions. A person’s worldview can be reshaped by any number of
powerful influences, and when such influences are particularly coercive, they
can lead to criminal behavior. Consider the case of Alex Cabarga, whose
indoctrination was perhaps just as strong as Tenneson’s, despite the fact that
it occurred in the middle of San Francisco at the hands of a single civilian.38
Alex Cabarga was abandoned by his biological parents and raised by a
sadistic pedophile named Tree Frog from the age of five.39 Tree Frog raped
and abused the child for more than a decade, beating him and depriving him
of food and water whenever he resisted Tree Frog’s sexual violations.40 The
34. Id. at 161.
35. Id. at 209.
36. Id. at 197; But see Donald Braman, Dan Kahan, & David Hoffman, Some
Realism About Punishment Naturalism, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1531, 1537 (arguing that
empirical desert fails to provide a credible account of the social and cognitive
mechanisms by which individuals evaluate both crime and punishment).
37. See supra text accompanying notes 1–5.
38. Robinson, supra note 3.
39. Robinson supra note 3 at 223.
40. Id.
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pair lived together in a van, avoiding contact with the rest of the world.
Cabarga never went to school or had meaningful contact with anyone other
than Tree Frog, who Cabarga depended for all of his basic needs.41 When
Tree Frog decided that he needed more children to enslave, Cabarga
cooperated in the kidnapping, abuse, and rape of two other children.42
Cabarga was arrested the week after he turned eighteen and was charged with
rape and kidnapping.43 Finally exposed to the outside world, Cabarga
expressed genuine remorse at the errors of his ways, and his judge noted that
while Cabarga did commit crimes, he too was a victim of his captor. 44
As with Tenneson, there was no existing criminal law doctrine that
recognized a defense or even a significant mitigation for Cabarga.
Unsurprisingly, he was convicted and given a life sentence.45 But some on
the appellate court understood that the issue of Cabarga’s blameworthiness
was more muddled than criminal law doctrine was willing to recognize. “A
sentence of life imprisonment for Cabarga, who the evidence overwhelmingly
discloses was Johnson’s ‘third victim,’ is constitutionally excessive,” two
justices opined in dissent.46 Another dissenting opinion took an even stronger
view, arguing, “If the record makes anything clear, it is that Alex Cabarga is
as tragic a victim as the girl he helped to kidnap; a victim not just of Tree Frog
Johnson but of the misguided parents who delivered him to that monstrous
pedophile at the age of about 10.”47 The dissent suggested that Cabarga never
should have been tried as an adult and that he should receive a hearing to redetermine his capacity to stand trial. 48 In both cases, either by virtue of
immaturity or insanity, the dissent suggested that Cabarga was somehow
incapacitated and rationally impaired at the time of his offense.49 Cabarga’s
term was reduced to twenty-five years, and he was subsequently paroled after
thirteen years.50 In other words, while the criminal law’s formal liability and
mitigation rules could not help Cabarga, the moral intuitions of the individual
judges push them to find some way to ameliorate the law’s failure.
The Cabarga case hints at the size of the indoctrination problem for
criminal law. The potential for blamelessness or significantly reduced
blameworthiness exists not just in the unusual and extreme case of POW

41. Id. at 224–26.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Erin Hallissey, Tara Burke’s Triumph Over Terror, S.F. GATE, Oct. 27, 1997,
https://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/PAGE-ONE-Tara-Burke-s-Triumph-OverTerror-15-2799170.php#item-85307-tbla-3 [https://perma.cc/4NEN-R7X6].
45. Id.
46. Philip Hager, 208-Year Term in 1982 Child Molestation Case Rejected, L.A.
TIMES, Sep. 3, 1988, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1988-09-03-mn3141-story.html [https://perma.cc/Y56W-JTBQ].
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Robinson supra note 3 at 226.
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Tenneson but rather can arise in a wide variety of situations that involve
neither imprisonment nor even an indoctrination program. It is a common
occurrence in the modern world that governments, religions, political groups,
a host of other organizations, and indeed individuals, consciously manipulate
others toward criminal conduct through a variety of indoctrination
mechanisms. If this sounds too hokey, consider just some of the high-profile
instances of indoctrination that have emerged within the context of the
criminal law in the past year. Members of a sex cult called Nxivm were
charged in Brooklyn for coercively indoctrinating women into sexual
servitude and a complex pyramid scheme;51 the Chinese Communist Party
was widely reprimanded for carrying out a coercive indoctrination program
designed to irrevocably alter the culture and belief systems of Chinese Uighur
Muslims;52 and an anti-Semitic mass shooter in Jersey City was charged with
coercively indoctrinating his co-conspirator girlfriend and forcing her to
believe in his hateful ideas.53 Thus, while Cabarga is the tip of the iceberg,
the use of mechanisms of indoctrination remains quite prevalent in ways that
meaningfully impacts the criminal law.
As noted at the start of this Article, an attempt to take indoctrination into
account in assessing criminal liability would represent a significant shift in
the criminal law’s focus because it drops the criminal law’s long-standing
assumption that (sane) people are responsible for who they are. Is the criminal
law now to investigate how an offender came to have any beliefs and values
that contributed to his or her offense? Some would fear that such a practice
would boil down to viewing each offender as the sum of the various social
influences she had been exposed to rather than the choices she made. Such a
process of investigation and tabulation in pursuit of a moral ledger of decisionmaking would be lengthy and expensive for a court to undertake. One might
argue that to avoid this problem, the criminal law liability rules ought simply
to ignore the problem of absent or reduced blameworthiness in indoctrination
cases, and instead leave the issue to judicial sentencing discretion. After all,
such discretion ameliorated Cabarga’s life sentence. But this approach has
serious and unacceptable deficiencies.
First, in a world of mandatory minimum sentences and statutory
sentencing guidelines, the judiciary may lack the discretion required to
adequately mitigate the sentences of indoctrinated defendants. Second,
51. Nicole Hong, Nxivm Sex Cult Was Also a Huge Pyramid Scheme, Lawsuit
Says,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Jan.
29,
2020,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/29/nyregion/nxivm-lawsuit-keith-raniere.html
[https://perma.cc/G8LT-9S42].
52. Juliette Garside & Emma Graham-Harrison, UK Calls for UN Access to
Chinese Detention Camps in Xinjiang, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 25, 2019,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/25/uk-calls-for-un-access-chinesedetention-camps-xinjiang [https://perma.cc/U6DV-RNX5].
53. Leah Simpson, New Jersey Shooter’s Niece Says He Wasn’t Always A
Monster, DAILYMAIL.COM, Dec. 15, 2019, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article7795177/New-Jersey-shooters-niece-describes-horror-learning-cool-uncle-massmurderer.html [https://perma.cc/4BMD-JL5A].
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relying upon sentencing discretion invites unjustified disparity among similar
cases depending on the judge tasked with adjudicating the case. The
offender’s ultimate liability may depend upon their good or bad luck in the
judicial assignment rather than their relative blameworthiness. Third, an
indoctrination defense/mitigation is the classic kind of fact-based judgment
decision that requires a jury rather than an individual sentencing judge. A jury
is better suited than a judge to perform this normative task because it better
represents community judgments of justice.54 Fourth, jury decision-making
on these issues will improve the system’s reputation with the community for
being just and, as noted previously, such increased moral credibility can have
significant crime-control benefits.55
It is for these reasons that we argue only a codified defense/mitigation
provision can set each decision-maker with the same task and orientation.
Understanding the motivations behind an indoctrinated offender’s choice to
commit an offense involves issues on which most people have some kind of
intuitive justice judgment. But without the framework of some kind of
analytic structure, different people’s intuitions on a case may play out
differently if for no other reason than that different people may focus on
different factors.
Finally, part of the value of having a codified indoctrination provision is
that it requires a principled analysis of what the contours of the
defense/mitigation doctrine should be. A collection of case opinions can
provide a partial set of rules but, unlike an appellate judge dealing with the
case at hand, a code provision provides a universal rule that will apply to all
cases, and that kind of universal-rule drafting simply cannot be done without
first elucidating the underlying governing principles. Development of such a
principle is a significant and challenging analytic task, well beyond what is
realistic to expect of an individual sentencing judge or even a panel of
appellate judges deciding an individual case.

IV. SOURCES OF SOCIAL INFLUENCE
The Cabarga case shows that effective indoctrination can take place
even in the absence of a formal indoctrination program, such as that used on
POW Tenneson. But the indoctrination mechanisms at work in Cabarga’s
situation are not unique or even unusual. A person’s beliefs and values are
regularly and continuously, altered through a wide variety of mechanisms that
would not normally be thought of as programs of indoctrination. They are,
rather, simply common sources of social influence.
Social influence is not always a sinister weapon of coercion, but instead
is often an innocuous practice that presents itself in everyday life. An analysis
of social influence begins with accepting the premise that people are easily
persuaded by one another. Conformity is widely understood as a socially
54. Paul H. Robinson & Barbra A. Spellman, Sentencing Decisions: Matching
the Decisionmaker to the Decision Nature, 105 COLUM. L. REV., 1124, 1130 (2005).
55. See Robinson, supra note 12, chapters 8 & 9.
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transmitted evolutionary trait wherein individuals adopt the most common
characteristics within their particular community as a means of surviving
environmental challenges.56 Allowing oneself to be influenced by others
decreases the time and energy one must put into individual learning.57 By
learning from the mistakes of our peers, we can adopt successful strategies for
navigating the uncertainties of our environment or social group.
In modern societies, social scientists and philosophers of all stripes have
agonized over widespread human susceptibility to social influence.58 As
Alexis de Tocqueville wrote while surveying American political culture in the
early nineteenth century, “Whenever social conditions are equal, public
opinion presses with enormous strength upon the minds of each individual; it
surrounds, directs, and oppresses him; and this arises from the very nature of
society much more than from its political laws.”59 John Stuart Mill was
similarly concerned about the power of social influence to undermine
individual liberty, writing of the members of nineteenth century English
society:
It does not occur to them to have any inclination, except for what is
customary. Thus the mind itself is bowed to the yoke: even in what people do
for pleasure, conformity is the first thing thought of; they like in crowds; they
exercise choices only among things commonly done; peculiarity of taste,
eccentricity of conduct, are shunned equally with crimes.60
Today, both academic and popular concern about the powers of social
influence have not waned. As more and more individuals associate in various
groups, buoyed by the connective power of the Internet, conformity can be
found in virtually every corner of social life. Two major influences of
individual behavior motivate our conforming beliefs and behaviors: the
actions and statements of others, and the desire to be well-regarded by our
peers.61 To the former point, individuals are swayed by myriad factors which
appear to augment the legitimacy of an argument. These include the number
of people that appear to support a particular opinion, the confidence displayed
by those articulating a view, the special expertise possessed by the person
conveying information, and the degree of similarity between the person
professing a certain belief and the person receiving that belief, among other
factors.62 As legal scholar Cass Sunstein has written, “Conformity is often a
rational course of action . . . One reason we conform is that we often lack

56. STEPHEN COLEMAN, POPULAR DELUSIONS: HOW SOCIAL CONFORMITY
MOLDS SOCIETY AND POLITICS 7 (2007).
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, CONFORMITY: THE POWER OF SOCIAL INFLUENCE
5–6 (2019); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 57 (2001 Batoche Books ed.) (1859);
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA vol. 2, § 3, ch. 21 (Arthur
Goldhammer trans., Amer. Classics ed. 2004) (1840).
59. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 55 at § 3 Ch. 21.
60. MILL, supra note 55 at 57.
61. SUNSTEIN, supra note 55 at 5–6.
62. Id.
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information of our own – about health, about investments, about law, and
about politics – and the decisions of others provide the best available
information about what should be done.”63 Following one another can secure
our membership in a particular group and prevent us from making mistakes
that we might make by relying on our individual reasoning. It can also create
echo chambers, constrain free speech, and facilitate authoritarianism.
Consider a few common examples of sources of social influence.

A. Rhetorical Advantage
Where an individual or group advocates for a position that appeals to our
most innate convictions and cherished sensibilities, they are more likely to
persuade us.64 This phenomenon, known as rhetorical advantage, is not
premised on the rhetorical abilities of the speaker, but rather the inherent
moral sway of the belief discussed and the degree to which that belief is
aligned with social norms.65 Many prominent examples of rhetorical
advantage occur in the realm of medicine, where doctors must make grave
decisions about patients’ lives.66 Though individually a doctor might make
his or her decisions according to cost benefit analysis or other means of
evaluation, in groups, they are hard pressed to justify their decision to not
resuscitate a patient.67 Articulating such a decision is simply more difficult
because there is a rhetorical advantage disfavoring behavior that seems averse
to heroic acts. People do not want to exhibit certain non-normative traits in
front of their peers, so they behave in particular ways to avoid the shame that
might come from defense of socially non-normative positions.

B. In-Group and Out-Group
If an individual is from within a group in which we imagine ourselves,
he is more likely to be a credible and persuasive source of information for
us.68 If he is from a group that we distrust or dislike, or any kind of “outgroup,” we are likely to reject whatever new information or opinions he is
giving us.69 The in-group/out-group distinction is most effective where group

63. Id. at 4.
64. Id. at 89.
65. Id. at 91–92.
66. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, GOING TO EXTREMES: HOW LIKE MINDS UNITE AND
DIVIDE 36–37 (2009).
67. Id. at 37.
68. CHARLES STANGOR, PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY Ch. 11, pt. 1 (2014),
https://opentextbc.ca/socialpsychology/chapter/ingroup-favoritism-and-prejudice/
[https://perma.cc/H7RN-D9C9].
69. Id.; see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 55 at 6 (“It is also true that some people
have far more influence than others, simply because the decisions of those people
convey more information. We are especially likely to follow those who are confident
(‘the confidence heuristic’), who have special expertise, who seem most like us, who
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identity is psychologically salient such as religious beliefs, political parties,
race, gender, or nationality.70 People speak differently about their group
versus other groups, attributing broad positive characteristics to themselves,
but denigrating the attitudes and beliefs of those they perceive as unlike
them.71 These trait attributions result in the tendency to view out-groups as
unrealistically negative.72 Any negative behavior undertaken by the outgroup is seen as reflective of larger characteristics of the group and is rarely
attributed to aberrant individuality.73 The same is true of positive behaviors
exhibited by the in-group such that any act reflective of wider social norms is
seen as innately characteristic of the in-group as a whole.74
In-group favoritism also has the effect of increasing polarization within
a group by reducing the possibility of dissent.75 The celebration of particular
social ties among members of the in-group similarly quiets diverse points of
view and reinforces decision-making based on social identification rather than
rational, individual choice.76 This tendency was demonstrated quite clearly in
a 1971 experiment conducted by social psychologist Henri Tajfel.77 Tajfel
and his colleagues showed high school students two paintings and divided the
students into two groups, allegedly by the students’ preferences for each
artist.78 The students were then asked to determine each other’s pay for
participating in the study, and each of the students uniformly gave more
money to people in their group than people in the other group.79 The study
showed that even where there is no real group at all, people will exhibit ingroup favoritism.80 That is, the very fact of group membership marshals
individual beliefs and behavior in line with social influence.

C. Confidence
It is widely recognized that there is a strong link between confidence and
extremism, such that confident people are both more influential and more

fare best, or whom we otherwise have reason to trust. It is worth underlining the phrase
‘most like us’; for better or for worse, those are the people whose beliefs often have
the largest impact on our own.”).
70. STANGOR, supra note 67 at pt. 3.
71. Id. at pt. 2.
72. Id.
73. Id. at ch. 11, pt. 2.
74. Id.
75. Id. at ch. 11, pt. 5.
76. Cass Sunstein, The Law of Group Polarization, JOHN M. OLIN L. & E. WORK.
PAPER NO. 91 5 (Dec. 7, 1999).
77. Henri Tajfel, M.G. Billig, R.P. Bundy, & Claude Flament, Social
Categorization and Intergroup Behaviour, EURO. J. OF SOC. PSYCH. 149, 149 (Apr.
1971).
78. Id. at 165.
79. Id. at 166.
80. Id. at 168-69.
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prone to polarization.81 Where a question is posed to a group of people,
generally the person who most confidently answers the question will be seen
as having the correct answer, and others in the group will follow her lead.82
Confidence is strongly correlated with authority and is preserved through
reputation.83 A person who is “known to know” will be more readily believed
by members of her group, and such members might rely on her knowledge as
a heuristic when learning new information or making a decision.84 As
behavioral economists Jonathan Thomas and Ruth McFadyen found in 1995,
there is evidence which suggests that in group discussions, more weight is
placed on the confidence with which arguments are presented than the content
of those arguments.85 More often than not, informational influence is
mediated through an expression of confidence.
The confidence heuristic is particularly strong where the position
confidently advocated for mirrors the decision maker’s pre-discussion
inclinations.86 In any deliberation where new information that aligns with a
group member’s preconceived notions is confidently disseminated, the group
member is more likely to believe the information and become more strongly
convinced of his prior position.87 Social influence, rather than informational
influence, therefore contributes most strongly to group polarization in
deliberative situations. In groups where unanimity is required to make
decisions, groups are often more likely to move towards extreme positions
where those articulating such views make their cases most confidently.88 This
is particularly true where the contested matter is not an obscure fact, but rather
a matter of highly visible public questions, such as whether capital
punishment is justified or whether abortion should be criminalized.89 In such
cases, the most extreme views will carry the most weight, articulated by the
most confident authority, such that the rest of the group feels compelled to
follow.

D. Authority Figures
Perhaps the strongest social influence of all is the presence of an
authority figure who is seen as having some special knowledge or expertise.90
Authority figures have been shown to not only encourage changes in
81. SUNSTEIN, supra note 55 at 14–15.
82. Id. at 14.
83. Id. at 24.
84. Id. at 95.
85. Jonathan Thomas & Ruth McFadyen, The Confidence Heuristic: A GameTheoretic Approach, 16 J. Econ. Psych. 97 (1995).
86. Cass Sunstein, The Law of Group Polarization, John M. Olin Program in L.
and Econ. Working Paper No. 91, 12 (1999).
87. Id. at 10.
88. Id. at 11.
89. Id. at 16.
90. SUNSTEIN, supra note 55 at 35.
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individual attitudes and opinions, but also changes in moral judgments.91 An
authority figure can override an individual’s most deeply held beliefs if, under
the right circumstances, he is able to subtly pressure the individual into
adhering to his views.
Several studies in social psychology have confirmed the strength of such
influence. Perhaps the most prominent of these is the psychologist Stanley
Milgram’s experiment in which subjects were subtly pressured into
administering painful electric shocks to a stranger.92 There, the subjects, who
were under the impression that the purpose of the experiment was to test the
effects of punishment on memory, delivered fake shocks to an individual who,
unbeknownst to them, was an actor working with Milgram.93 As the actor
writhed in simulated pain, the subjects were asked by a doctor in a lab coat to
administer higher and higher shocks.94 The doctor had no power to enforce
any sanctions on the subjects if they refused to continue, and yet, without fail,
all of the subjects acquiesced to the doctor’s demands, shocking the actors
well near the maximum level permitted on the machine – nearly 450 volts.95
The subjects’ responses confirmed Sunstein’s observation that people react
most strongly to an individual “whose credentials and good faith they [think]
they [can] trust.”96
The results of the study serve as a clear demonstration of the compelling
power of uniformed authority buoyed by special expertise. Where an
individual is commanded by someone she perceives as a credentialed and
knowledgeable authority, she is far more likely to follow instructions and
suspend her skepticism.97 This is particularly true where she perceives her
involvement as being in pursuit of an important goal, such as a scientific
experiment or a religious project.98 Ultimately, people are alarmingly quick
to adopt a trusted authority’s moral judgement as their own, quickly
displacing their own convictions and deeply held beliefs.
As these examples show, the social realities of virtually every interaction
support the premise that people are easily persuaded by one another. People
are persuaded by those who speak confidently, those who appear to be in their
particular social milieu, those who hold authoritative titles or credentials, and
those who can express themselves in a way that appeals to core moral beliefs.
Given the frequency with which all of us are susceptible to social pressures,
it is unsurprising that even intelligent, sophisticated adults can be ensnared by
organizations that marshal these influential tactics to serve their own
purposes. Doomsday cults, authoritarian regimes, extremist religious groups,
91. Charles Helm & Mario Morelli, Stanley Milgram and the Obedience
Experiment: Authority, Legitimacy, Human Action 7 Political Theory 321, 328 (1979).
92. Id. at 321.
93. Id. at 322.
94. Id. at 323.
95. Id. at 323–324.
96. SUNSTEIN, supra note 55 at 32.
97. Helm & Morelli, supra note 88 at 325.
98. Id. at 332.
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and military branches are just some of the types of groups that use
programmatic methods of social influence in order to alter the behavior of
their members. By controlling every aspect of their recruits’ lives, these
organizations are able to nudge behavior quickly and efficiently.

V. COMMON SOURCES OF EFFECTIVE INDOCTRINATION
Effective indoctrination can occur anywhere that strong social influence
is present. Though public attention on indoctrination is typically limited only
to those most extraordinary instances of coercion, such as the case of
Tenneson, more often, indoctrination takes place in communities and
institutions far removed from a prisoner of war camp. Arguably the most
widespread forms of indoctrinating environments are spaces in which many
of us feel comfortable, such as religious institutions, the military, and political
organizations. Within these unique environs, each subject is molded using
variations of the same indoctrinating techniques utilized in POW camps.
Through deprivation, surveillance, isolation, confessions, social pressure and
other techniques, recruits’ perceptions of the world change, and their
deference to certain leaders, doctrines, or codes of conduct becomes more
unquestioning and committed.
Without the political intrigue associated with threats of communism,
these more mundane forms of social influence are often dismissed as
innocuous facets of group associations. Such a characterization diminishes
their immense power, however, and ignores the dozens of narratives pointing
to the ways in which fairly common persuasive techniques can lead
individuals to throw away their former selves, subjugate their capacity to
make individual choices, and commit themselves to the ideology of another.
Of course, institutionalized encouragement of conformity and deference to
authority is not threatening when such institutions remain open to dissenting
voices and susceptible to change by evolving social norms. But when they do
not – as is the case in authoritarian political parties, extremist religious groups,
and to some extent, the military – a subject might become just as indoctrinated
as Tenneson.

A. Political Indoctrination by Authoritarian States
Indoctrination toward political extremism is most clearly conceptualized
as the process of converting everyday citizens into complete, unquestioning
devotees of leader and party in an authoritarian regime. Most authoritarian
states have used major institutions such as the educational system, the state
media, and cultural establishments in order to control the public narrative
about the success of the ruling political party and its leader.
Youth are, for the most part, indoctrinated through their schools which
use political imagery, routines, and lecturing in order to instill the party
message on students. In Nazi Germany, for example, students could expect
to learn in a classroom covered with photos of Adolf Hitler; practice chants,
salutes, and physical exercises in the name of the Fuhrer; and learn ahistorical
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lessons legitimizing the Nazi mission and vilifying perceived enemies.99
Under the innocuous, didactic guise of a traditional lesson for school children,
Nazi ideology was spread to the youth. Youth groups similarly inculcate skills
and ideology that will be valuable to the youths once they pursue positions in
the party or in the military. Such groups teach survival techniques, military
expertise, and party slogans in order to one day craft the most efficient and
resilient band of soldiers possible for the country.100 For example, the Hitler
Youth, a mandatory, dystopian scouts program premised on the construction
of intergenerational continuity between Hitler and his successors, transformed
thousands of German youth into dedicated machines of the party.101
The media has often been used by authoritarian states as a means of
communicating false ideas to the population in order to convince them to
behave in a particular way or to assuage their anxieties about the shortcomings
of the regime.102 Typically, the former is accomplished by the transmission
of panicked, exaggerated messages which serve to instill fear in the public and
inspire them to act irrationally in the interest of the ruling party.103 The
Rwandan genocide, for example, was instigated in large part by the radio
messages disseminated by the ruling Hutus regarding the alleged threats posed
by the minority Tutsis.104 Much of the news coverage conveyed on these
programs was entirely false; however, it was effective in ginning up panicked
commitment to the Hutu ethnicity as both a political and social movement.105
The paucity of dissenting opinions on the air waves served to reify the
assumed credibility of the party message.
Finally, cultural establishments serve to propagate the party message by
providing a widely accessible, entertaining means of inspiring patriotism in
the public. In Nazi Germany, for example, Joseph Goebbels went to great
lengths to convey imaginative and exciting depictions of the Nazi war effort,
parodying British and American soldiers as weak and incompetent in
comparison with the powerful German Wehrmacht.106 German citizens left
the theater feeling empowered, confident in the party, and united against a
clearly defined enemy.107 In Soviet Russia, similarly, film served as a
powerful means of instilling pride in everyday people regarding the power of

99. ALFONS HECK, A CHILD OF HITLER: GERMANY IN THE DAYS WHEN GOD
WORE A SWASTIKA 17 (1985).
100. Id. at 8.
101. Id. at 9–10.
102. Leonard W. Doob, Goebbels’ Principles of Propaganda, 14 THE PUBLIC
OPINION QUARTERLY 419, 431 (1950).
103. Id. at 438.
104. PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL
BE KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES: STORIES FROM RWANDA 18 (1999).
105. Id. at 77.
106. Doob supra note 99 at 441.
107. Id. at 427.
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the Soviet state, while diminishing any shortcomings of the state.108 At the
same time, any dissenting opinion was censored thoroughly by the state, and
critical writers and filmmakers were publicly degraded as so-called enemies
of the people.109 This monopoly on cultural expression undoubtedly inspired
many Soviet citizens, effectively persuading them to set aside whatever
skepticism or criticism they might have about the party.110

B. Religious Radicalization
The process of religious radicalization occurs through individual,
organizational, and environmental means, playing off of a person’s unique
social network and personal values. Such radicalization typically begins with
feelings of oppression or marginalization in particular minority subgroups.111
This “us against them” mentality serves to unify the group around the idea of
a common struggle regardless of whether the group’s members were born into
the organization or joined voluntarily. For example, conflicts in Bosnia and
Palestine are often cited as having stoked the fires of moral outrage among
some Muslim individuals who were later radicalized.112 The experience of
understanding the lived conditions of their marginalized fellow believers,
coupled with an appreciation of the ways in which such marginalization plays
out on a wider geo-political scale, can increase feelings of humiliation and
unrest, ultimately culminating in the feeling that the religion itself is at war or
is persecuted.
Often at this point, recruits investigate more radical fringes of the
religion in question by joining more conservative places of worship, seeking
mentorship from more radicalized clerics, and investigating more extremist
fringes of their faith online.113 Having expressed interest, the recruit is
gradually lured into the extremist ideology with increasingly totalizing forays
into his world.114 Extremist recruiters are well trained at identifying those
who might seem particularly vulnerable to their influence, either because of
loneliness, isolation, or feelings of personal marginalization.115 They
communicate with the recruit often in an accessible means and invite him to

108. DAVID BRANDENBERGER, PROPAGANDA STATE IN CRISIS: SOVIET IDEOLOGY,
INDOCTRINATION, AND TERROR 168, 169 (2011).
109. Id. at 166.
110. Id. at 178.
111. Stages of the Radicalization and Deradicalization Process, PRACTICES
PARTNERSHIP AGAINST VIOLENT RADICALIZATION IN CITIES NETWORK 13, 14, Oct. 31,
2018,
https://efus.eu/files/2019/03/D3.3-Stages-of-the-radicalization-andderadicalization-process-PRACTICIES-Def.pdf [ https://perma.cc/726D-KCPQ].
112. Id.
113. Muhammad Fraser-Rahim, In and Out of Extremism USA, QUILLIAM 16, 17
(2019).
114. Id. at 18.
115. Id. at 17–18.
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share personal information with them.116 Out of this good rapport, they
propagandize and inspire others to join them.
After repeated, consistent exposure to the radical religious worldview,
the recruits come to not only understand the arguments behind extremist
action, but to also begin to internalize these arguments. At this point, the
recruit is typically encouraged to engage in a series of escalating
commitments, each designed to increase his tolerance for challenging and
uncomfortable tasks.117 First, he might be asked to donate a small sum of
money to the organization. Then, he might be asked to help recruit new
members, to host formal group meetings, to quit his job and devote all of his
time to the group, to renounce his family and friends, and so on and so forth
until his new identity as a member of the particular religion is completely
consolidated.118
Throughout this process, the recruit receives meaningful benefits that
encourage his continued participation in the group.119 These could include
praise, a higher purpose, a sense of community, financial benefits, a sense of
connection with one’s ancestry, or any number of items.120 These selfinterested pursuits spur their continued involvement with their newfound
affiliations until they become so ingrained in the group, so convinced of its
mission or ideals, that the group’s rationale and ideological posture merges
with the individual’s own.
It is important to also mention that while the most documented process
of religious radicalization is that of radical Islam, radicalization is no doubt at
play among the far reaches of evangelical Christianity, ultraorthodox sects of
Judaism, the Hindu nationalist movement, and others.121 All of these groups
share feelings of persecution and marginalization, amplified by a resonance
with personal experiences and mobilized by insular social networks – online
and in real life – entirely devoid of non-believers.

116. It is well-documented that the internet has facilitated recruitment and
indoctrination in extremist organizations. Violent extremists utilize online forums and
chat rooms as well as social networking sites to identify and reach out to vulnerable
individuals, enticing them to join their ranks and convincing them of the worthiness
of their cause. See, e.g., FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Don’t Be a Puppet (last
visited
May
31,
2020),
https://www.fbi.gov/cve508/teen-website/how;
[https://perma.cc/9QP9-NAYB]; DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Working to Counter
Online Radicalization to Violence in the United States, (Feb. 5, 2013),
https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/working-counter-online-radicalizationviolence-united-states. [https://perma.cc/MC7K-6LDT].
117. JAMES WALLER, BECOMING EVIL: HOW ORDINARY PEOPLE COMMIT
GENOCIDE AND MASS KILLING 205 (2002).
118. Id. at 206, 207.
119. Robert Baron, Arousal, Capacity, and Intense Indoctrination, 4
PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY REV. 238, 241 (2000).
120. Id. at 245.
121. AREF M. AL-KHATTAR, RELIGION AND TERRORISM: AN INTERFAITH
PERSPECTIVE 27, 29, 35 (2003).
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C. Military Indoctrination
The indoctrination process carried out by various military branches can
be broadly conceptualized as the process of turning civilians into service
members. The process involves far more than the accumulation of technical
skills, and instead hinges on the internalization of a particular disposition,
which is intended to supersede the innately individualistic posture of civilian
life. 122 Military indoctrination occurs predominantly in the training camps of
the various branches of the military, yet the instilling of military doctrine
continues throughout the recruit’s entire enlistment, both on the battlefield
and off.123 Service members are taught to think like soldiers, to make
decisions in high-stress, life-threatening situations, to identify risks, and to
lead their comrades.124
Indoctrinating a service member follows many of the traditional tactics
of indoctrination used in cults and other extremist groups. First, the recruit is
“softened up” by separating the recruit from his family and bringing him to a
secure, often isolated training base where he is subjected to strenuous physical
challenges under stressful and disorienting conditions.125 At the same time,
the recruit is encouraged to forget his individuality, and instead to adopt the
identity of the group in a stage known to social psychologists as
“depluralization.”126 Recruits are not spoken to by their first names, but rather
by their rank, and in the Marine Corps, recruits refer to themselves in the third
person, starting sentences not with “I,” but instead, “the private.”127 Recruits
sleep together, eat together, participate in the same training, wear the same
uniforms, learn the same information, and endure the same physical
challenges, building a sense of uniformity and esprit de corps.128
Next, the behaviors learned in training camp are cemented in the
recruits’ minds such that they become second nature. Recruits are constantly
in the presence of their training officers and under surveillance.129 Random
bunk checks in which recruits are berated for not having their beds properly
made or their belongings properly organized instill a high degree of selfpolicing behavior in the recruit, ingraining practices of neatness, cleanliness,

122. Dennis McGurk, David Cotting, Thomas Britt, & Amy Adler, The Role of
Indoctrination in Transforming Civilians to Service Members (2006) in MILITARY
LIFE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SERVING IN PEACE AND COMBAT 13, 14 (Vol. 2, 2013).
123. Id. at 13.
124. Id. at 15.
125. Id. at 16.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 17.
128. Id.
129. Officer Candidates School: Above the Scrutiny, U.S. MARINES (last visited
Jun. 1, 2020), https://www.marines.com/becoming-a-marine/officer/training.html
[https://perma.cc/6UMP-A4Q5].
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and self-discipline.130 In mock combat situations, recruits are deprived of
food and sleep and are asked to perform complex decision-making tasks for
which success requires that they rely on their ingrained beliefs and uniquely
militaristic logic.131
Instead of committing themselves unquestioningly to a particular leader,
however, service members are taught to adopt the values sewn onto their
patches and printed all over their recruiting materials.132 Celebration of these
socially acceptable values has an enormous role in reining in the degree to
which service members are expected to eschew their personal moral code in
order to appease a commander.133 For example, a private would be lauded for
rejecting a command from his captain to harm an unarmed civilian as such an
act would be against the fundamental moral tenets of military engagement.134
Adherence to particular standards of behavior broadly aimed at helping those
in need serves to reinforce the line between combatants and non-combatants
and encourages soldiers to engage in socially positive acts, such as delivering
food to children in warzones or providing rescue efforts in the wake of
national disasters.

D. Conclusion
The unifying theme across all of these types of indoctrination is the
leveraging of the legitimacy of long heralded, stable institutions as a means
of conveying a highly indoctrinating message. These groups and institutions
show that indoctrination can take place anywhere so long as the institutional
environment and the socializing techniques employed can produce a
committed and deferential subject. Certainly, such radical messages would
not be so widely and confidently adopted were they not transmitted through
authorities in which the public has historically maintained significant
confidence. Schools, the press, and the arts have long been far more trusted
and compelling institutions than any sort of political body, making them the
perfect vessels through which to convey the party message.
Political, religious, and military indoctrination hinge on the ability to
control nearly every aspect of a recruit’s life, to de-individuate him from his
peers, and to commit him to a cause that appears larger than himself. It is a
challenging task to turn an everyday citizen into a violent zealot. Such

130. Recruit Training: Above the Stress, U.S. MARINES (last visited Jun. 1, 2020),
https://www.marines.com/becoming-a-marine/officer/training.html
[https://perma.cc/4NMV-YV6Q].
131. Recruit Training: In The Midst Of Doubt, U.S. MARINES (last visited Jun. 1,
2020),
https://www.marines.com/becoming-a-marine/officer/training.html
[perma.cc/4NMV-YV6Q].
132. MCGURK ET AL., supra note 119 at 15.
133. Id.
134. U.S. ARMY, Field Manual No. 27-2: Your Conduct in Combat Under the Law
of War 5 (Nov. 23, 1984), https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/conduct-incombat-1984.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8RD-TVZM].
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indoctrination requires more than simple acknowledgement and
understanding of a particular point of view, but rather an unquestioning
dedication to the party’s professed doctrine. Unlike a green grocer in a
totalitarian state, who hangs up the party slogan in his shop every day,
performing patriotism all the while knowing that it is all a charade, the
indoctrinated subjects of the military, religious, and political institutions
described above are truly convinced of every facet of the ideology they have
adopted.135 Their interests are effectively inseparable from those of the
organizations and groups to which they claim membership.

VI. THE INDOCTRINATION CONTINUUM
The previous sections have illustrated the wide variety of mechanisms
by which a person’s beliefs and values can be altered. But many, if not most,
of these indoctrination or social influence tactics are unlikely to reduce an
offender’s blameworthiness to the extent necessary to deserve a defense or
serious mitigation in the eyes of the community. Instead, ordinary people are
likely to see a continuum of personal responsibility and blameworthiness
depending upon the specific details of each case.136
In a study done with law students, subjects were asked to read cases
involving an offense committed under conditions suggesting some kind of
indoctrination. They were asked to judge for each case whether the defendant
deserves:
•
•
•
•
•

No mitigation (complete blameworthiness);
Minor mitigation (punishment reduced by ten percent or less, a primarily
symbolic gesture);
Moderate mitigation (punishment reduced by between ten percent and
fifty percent);
Major mitigation (punishment reduced by fifty percent or more,
essentially a one offense grade reduction in liability); or a
Complete defense.

In the survey, subjects were given a short narrative for each case, which
provided the facts relevant to the indoctrination and the offense, but not the
135. VACLAV HAVEL, POWER OF THE POWERLESS 28 (Routledge 2015).
136. Note that such a blameworthiness continuum exists in essentially all
disability excuses, such as insanity, involuntary intoxication, and duress, where there
may be a continuum of cognitive or control dysfunction, yet a decision-maker must
decide where on that continuum a defendant is entitled to a complete defense. Under
Model Penal Code’s insanity defense, for example, in §4.01(1), the decision-maker
must determine whether the offender “lacks substantial capacity” to appreciate the
criminality of or to control his conduct. Presumably, an offender who falls just short
of the “substantial capacity” cut off for complete defense in these cases deserves some
significant mitigation, such as a one offense grade reduction. Paul H.
Robinson, Mitigations: The Forgotten Side of the Proportionality Principle, 57 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 219, 229 (2020).
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legal disposition of the case. The text below gives summaries of the cases that
the subjects found to be the most blameworthy and least blameworthy.137
Each subject provided a response using the five-point liability survey
described above. The exact presentation is reproduced in the margin.138 The
same scale was used successfully in other surveys undertaken by participants
in the seminar. The results of the study are presented in the table below.
The results of the study, provided in the table below, suggest that the
subjects had little difficulty distinguishing among indoctrination cases along
a continuum of blameworthiness and deserved punishment. In fact, the rubric
of blameworthiness that guided subjects’ responses seemed very much in line
with the parameters of the subjects’ own justice judgments.

137. The full narratives used in the study are available from the principal author.
138. Survey Instructions and Liability Scale:
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SURVEY RESULTS: TWENTY-FOUR CASES RANKED IN ORDER OF
MITIGATION MEAN
MEAN

MODE

1. Tenneson

3.67

4

2. Heck

3.5

4

3. Cabarga

3.25

4

4. Kenton

2.33

3

5. Vlok

2.25

2

6. Jeffs

2.08

2

7. Malvo

1.92

2

8. Nawaz

1.67

2

CASES

9. Meadlo

1.42

0

10. Ongwen

1.5

1/2

11. Hearst

1.33

1

CASE
DESCRIPTIONS
Korean War POW
converted to
communism, refuses
US repatriation
Nazi youth leader,
fighter pilot fought
for German Nazi
domination
Given to pedophile
at age five, later
helps to kidnap and
rape other children
Raised in drug rehab
commune, leaves
rattlesnake in
mailbox
S. African official
encouraged acts of
violence to uphold
Apartheid
Born into religious
polygamous church
community, upholds
practices
Abandoned at age
eleven, trained by
guardian to commit
murders as teen.
Radical Islamicist
who works to recruit
others
Twenty-one-yearold soldier
participates in
massacre of
Vietnamese
villagers
Abducted, trained to
be child soldier,
then becomes leader
Kidnapped at age
nineteen, joins her
kidnappers to

EFFECT

Defense/Grade
Reduction

Moderate
Mitigation

Symbolic
Minor
Mitigation
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12. Picciolini

1.33

0

13. Van Houten

1.08

2

14. Vallat

1.08

0/1

15. Miller

1.08

0

16. Layton

1.0

0/1

17. McDonough

.83

0

18. Seromba

.83

0

19. Gotti

.58

0

20. Hardaway

0.5

0

21. Couch

0.42

0

22. Hayashi

0.25

0

23. Benjamin

0

0

commit a bank
robbery
Young man engages
in violence, hate
rhetoric for White
Power
Joins hippy
commune, helps to
commit crimes,
eventually murders
Junior al-Qaeda
operative who
participates in and
assists terrorism
Amish man who
obeys his wayward
Bishop and assaults
people
Joins socially active
church and later
attempts to kill
several people
Lover of sexual
sadist helps hide the
body of murdered
woman
Catholic priest in
Rwanda who
orchestrates a mass
killing
Joins his father as a
member of the
Mafia
Child gang member
follows orders to
commit murder
Unchecked by
parents, a teen’s
drunk driving causes
death of four
Surgeon joins
religious cult and
orchestrates a serine
gas attack
Man shoots and kills
Marines because he
feels a race war is
coming

767

No Mitigation

768

24. Vlasak
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0
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Doctor-turnedanimal activist via
spouse advocates
violence

Below is a table showing the percentage distribution of responses for the
cases judged the least and the most blameworthy. The mode for each case is
in bold.

MITIGATION DISTRIBUTIONS FOR THE LEAST BLAMEWORTHY AND
THE MOST BLAMEWORTHY CASES
Case

0%
≤10% 10-50% ≥50% Complete
Mit
Mit
Mit
Mit
Defense
Less Blameworthy Indoctrination Cases – Defense or Mitigation
1. Tenneson
8%
17%
75%
(POW)
2. Heck (Hitler 8%
33%
58%
Youth)
3. Cabarga
8%
8%
33%
50%
(Treefrog)
4. Kenton
8%
8%
33%
42%
8%
(snake)
5. Vlok
8%
58%
25%
8%
(Apartheid)
6. Jeffs
8%
25%
33%
17%
17%
(polygamy)
More Blameworthy Indoctrination Cases – No Mitigation
17.
67%
17%
17%
McDonough
(sex slave)
18. Seromba
50%
25%
17%
8%
(Rwanda)
19. Gotti
58%
25%
17%
(Mafia)
20. Hardaway
50%
50%
(gang)
21. Couch
67%
25%
8%
(affluenza)
22. Hayashi
75%
25%
(sarin gas)
23. Benjamin
100%
(RSB)
24. Vlasak
100%
(animal rights)

Mean
3.7
3.5
3.3
2.3
2.3
2.1

0.8
0.8
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.0
0.0
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In the first three cases – including Tenneson and Cabarga, discussed
previously – the most common response by the subjects was a complete
defense, with the mean of the subjects’ responses above 3.0. Three other cases
had a mean of between 2.0 and 3.0. In contrast, eight cases assessed in the
study had a mean between 0.0 and 1.0, and a mode of 0, indicating that the
subjects would not provide even a symbolic mitigation of ten percent.
This significant variation among the extent of mitigation offered to
different offenders suggests that subjects did not feel compelled to
categorically deny blameworthiness reductions, as current law does now, nor
did they feel compelled to award a significant mitigation or a complete
defense to every person who had experienced some sort of manipulation or
psychological influence. The wide array of responses across the gamut of
available mitigations suggests that an indoctrination defense could be
effectively operationalized because people are able to make nuanced complex
judgments about blameworthiness in such cases.
Consider below the cases ranked highest and lowest in terms of
blameworthiness and how their circumstances may affect judgments of
blameworthiness in cases with similar fact patterns. Of course, the strongest
cases for a mitigation or defense are those in which the offender appears least
blameworthy, while the weakest cases for a mitigation or defense are those in
which the offender appears most blameworthy. The criteria that affects such
blameworthiness determinations, as well as the associated mitigations or
defenses that such cases might elicit, are described in more detail below.

A. Indoctrination Cases That Seem Less Blameworthy
To begin, we consider the least blameworthy cases, which are the cases
most likely to elicit some form of liability reduction of a complete defense or
a major mitigation of a reduction of one offense grade. Each of these three
cases received a mean score of between 3.25 and 3.67 using the metric noted
above, and there was consistency among the fourteen surveyed subjects in
their responses.
Overwhelmingly, the strongest case was Tenneson. As discussed above,
Tenneson was a farm boy who had never traveled outside of Minnesota, but
decided to join the United States Army, at the age of seventeen, in order to
help his country in the Korean War effort.139 Unwaveringly patriotic, he told
his mother, “If I should win the congressional Medal of Honor, I still wouldn’t
have done enough for my country.”140 Only months later, though, this
politically unsophisticated young man was fully convinced of the superiority
of the communist system after having been subjected to a highly intrusive,
controlling, and abusive indoctrination program run by Chinese forces.141
What compelled subjects most about the Tenneson case was the unrelenting,
mechanistic nature of his indoctrination. The Chinese were highly trained at
139. DUNNE, supra note 1, at 116.
140. ROBINSON, supra note 3 at 145, 218.
141. Id.
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identifying particularly vulnerable individuals, and Tenneson, for all of his
youth and naivete, was the ideal candidate. After being worn down by a litany
of physical abuses such as starvation, long marches in the freezing cold, and
manual labor, the Chinese disoriented Tenneson by dramatically altering their
treatment of him, showering him with kindness, tending to his physical
ailments, and submitting him to a program of intensive reeducation so that in
this highly pliable state, he came to trust them and believe in their political
vision.142 At no point did Tenneson even have the chance to resist.
Next highest ranked by the subjects was Alfons Heck, who was raised in
the rural German Rhineland and was five years old when Adolf Hitler was
appointed Chancellor of Germany.143 Every aspect of Heck’s life supported
his devotion to the Nazi Party. His schoolteachers encouraged a commitment
to Hitler, as did his parents and friends, and every time he turned on the radio,
read a newspaper, or watched a movie, he was assured that following Hitler,
and fighting to defend him, was a righteous path.144 Most formative among
the various Third Reich institutions that distorted his perception of the world
was the Hitler Youth,145 in which Heck excelled and was ultimately given a
leadership role.146 Heck became so devoted to the Third Reich’s cause that
even as the German war effort began to deteriorate, Heck’s commitment to
Hitler did not wane.147 Heck was seen as particularly sympathetic to subjects
because of the formulaic, state-sanctioned nature of his indoctrination. Rather
than hiding from the rest of society in a deviant community, Heck was
propped up by the state for his dedication to the Nazi cause.148 Throughout
the most formative years of his life, Heck was exposed to no outside influence
that might have encouraged him to foment skepticism about the Third
Reich.149 The intensely patriotic culture in which he was raised made his
unquestioning adulation of Hitler seem like a foregone conclusion.
Following Heck in mitigation granted by the subjects was Cabarga,
discussed above, who was effectively raised as a prisoner of his abusive
guardian, Tree Frog. While Tree Frog was not operating a militaristic or statesanctioned indoctrination program, he perhaps intuitively used similar
procedures. Cabarga was kept isolated in Tree Frog’s van, raped frequently
by Tree Frog, denied access to outside information or social connections, and
repeatedly told that their way of living was morally superior.150 He was taught
to fear the outside world and distrust everyone except Tree Frog so that even
if he was presented with the opportunity to escape, Cabarga was too afraid to
142. Id.
143. HECK, supra note 96, at 17.
144. Id. at 9–10.
145. Id.
146. Linda Matchan, A Child in the Hitler Youth, CHI. TRIB. (June 5, 1985)
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1985-06-05-8502050352-story.html.
147. Id.
148. Id,
149. Id.
150. ROBINSON, supra note 3, at 224–26.
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attempt such a feat.151 Furthermore, Cabarga never had a sense of self before
being indoctrinated and thus had no point of reference in the outside world
from which to understand his precarious condition. Ultimately, Cabarga’s
vulnerable age, segregation from the rest of society, and lack of education
made him a particularly vulnerable target for Tree Frog’s indoctrination
techniques and thus a highly compelling case to the subjects in terms of
blameworthiness reduction.
Thus, among this top tier of cases, it seems clear that factors that support
a conclusion of major mitigation or near complete defense include: (1) the
amount of physical and psychological control over the offender’s daily life;
(2) whether the indoctrination was state-sanctioned; (3) the extent to which
violence, including sexual violence, was used to make the offender more
submissive; and (4) the vulnerability of the offender to such manipulation,
especially his youthfulness, relative isolation, and the deviance of the
ideology in which he was indoctrinated to believe. The overarching theme of
these top three cases, however, was the impossibility of resisting the
indoctrination or rejecting the ideology. Faced with no alternatives, and no
means of escape, these three men succumbed to the pressures of the only
world they knew or were able to know. The subjects found it difficult to
condemn them for what seemed to be perfectly reasonable responses to highly
manipulative, coercive, and disorienting situations.
Within the twenty-four cases the subjects read, a second tier of cases
emerged in which the subjects seemed in general agreement that the offender
should receive at least a moderate mitigation. These three cases had a mean
between 2.08 and 2.33 on the survey mechanism described above, which
reflected certain factual differences that made these cases slightly less
compelling than the major mitigation cases described above. In general, these
moderate mitigation cases featured offenders who were largely sympathetic
and appeared to have been clearly indoctrinated, but who had made certain
problematic decisions that undermined their ability to claim complete
blamelessness.
The highest score in this second group was given to Lance Kenton, who
was raised communally by the members of a drug rehabilitation community
called Synanon after his biological father left him there as a child.152 Kenton’s
primary caregivers were a group of dysfunctional adults who elected to isolate
themselves from the outside world, dress and cut their hair the same, and
engage in public ceremonies of violence designed to correct undesirable
behavior.153 Having been raised in this fear-based, insular environment,
Kenton never cultivated any spirit of independence and instead organized his
life around subservience to Synanon’s leader. Ultimately, Kenton attempted
151. Id.
152. DAVID GERSTEL, PARADISE INCORPORATED: SYNANON – A PERSONAL
ACCOUNT 267 (Novato: Presidio Press, 1982)
153. Hillel Aron, The Story of This Drug Rehab-Turned-Violent Cult is Wild, Wild
Country-Caliber
Bizarre,
L.A.
MAGAZINE
(Apr.
23,
2018),
https://www.lamag.com/citythinkblog/synanon-cult/ [https://perma.cc/2H56-749C].
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murder on the group’s behalf by putting a rattlesnake in the mailbox of a
lawyer suing the organization.154 Subjects viewed Kenton as having a strong
case for reduced blameworthiness because of his youth, his isolation from the
rest of society, and his subjection to extraordinary information control. For
young Kenton, rejecting his leader’s commands would constitute an
unimaginable disavowal of the only home he had ever known. Furthermore,
Kenton’s crime seemed a rational choice because nothing mattered more to
Kenton and the other members of Synanon than the survival of the group.
Eliminating a threat to the only group of people that had ever cared for him,
taught him, and invested in his growth seemed perhaps like more than an
ideological project, but rather a means of survival.155
Earning just slightly less mitigation than Kenton was Adriaan Vlok, who
was a child when South Africa institutionalized apartheid.156 Vlok was white
and lived in a racially homogenous community where he rarely encountered
other races outside of domestic servant roles.157 Growing up, he was exposed
to an all-encompassing, state-sponsored educational system that was designed
to teach white citizens the moral correctness of segregation.158 The developers
of apartheid had studied and copied the methods used by the Nazis to ensure
that no ordinary citizen ever thought to criticize the forced segregation of the
races. By the time Vlok graduated from high school, he was fully convinced
that apartheid was religiously ordained and scientifically proven.159 Because
of the stifling unavailability of outside information or conflicting
perspectives, Vlok was constrained to a silo of thought.
Later in life, in his capacity as South Africa’s Minister of Law and Order,
Vlok was responsible for quashing anti-apartheid activity in the country and
commissioned several assassinations of anti-apartheid leaders.160 After the
fall of apartheid, however, Vlok felt genuine remorse and admitted to his

154. Paul Morantz, The History of Synanon and Charles Dederich,
PAULMORANTZ.COM
(2009),
http://www.paulmorantz.com/cult/the-history-ofsynanon-and-charles-dederich/ [https://perma.cc/8DQ7-AXQ2].
155. Paul Morantz, The True Story of the Rattlesnake in the Mailbox,
PAULMORANTZ.COM (2009), http://www.paulmorantz.com/the_synanon_story/thetrue-story-of-the-rattlesnake-in-the-mailbox/ [https://perma.cc/U8UM-42M5].
156. South African History Online, Adriaan Vlok, SAHO, Aug. 23, 2019,
https://www.sahistory.org.za/people/adriaan-vlok [https://perma.cc/GZ82-GTVB].
157. Id.
158. Mary Kalantzis & Bill Cope, Apartheid Education, NEW LEARNING, CH. 5:
APARTHEID EDUCATION (last visited June 1, 2020) http://newlearningonline.com/newlearning/chapter-5/apartheid-education [https://perma.cc/7BN9-9XF3].
159. Id.; Erin Blakemore, The Harsh Reality of Life Under Apartheid in South
Africa, HISTORY.COM (May 9, 2019), https://www.history.com/news/apartheidpolicies-photos-nelson-mandela [https://perma.cc/3SYV-5DMH].
160. Eve Fairbanks, I Have Sinned Against the Lord and Against You! Will You
Forgive
Me?
THE
NEW
REPUBLIC
(Jun.
18,
2014),
https://newrepublic.com/article/118135/adriaan-vlok-ex-apartheid-leader-washesfeet-and-seeks-redemption [https://perma.cc/E7UC-G7XV].
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crimes in front of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission.161
Subjects were overwhelmingly sympathetic to Vlok because, like Heck, he
did not seem to have much choice in his adoption of the National Party’s
stance on apartheid. At every juncture in Vlok’s life, the National Party’s
stance on apartheid was impressed upon him, leaving him to believe that there
was only one correct path to follow, and the preservation of his country and
their way of life depended on his conformity. Still, Vlok was not as
sympathetic of a case as Heck because his crimes were much more serious
than Heck’s, and he was much older and more sophisticated than Heck at the
time that he perpetrated his crimes.
The final case ranked in this moderate mitigation group was Rachel
Jeffs, who was born into the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints (“FLDS”), one of the most radical sects of Mormonism.162 Jeffs’s
father, Warren Jeffs, was the leader of the church and sexually abused her,
beginning when she was eight years old.163 Like all of the children raised in
the church, Jeffs had no exposure to the outside world and was denied a
meaningful education.164 She was taught that all non-members of the church
were sinners and that if she disobeyed any of Warren’s commands, she too
would be condemned to eternal damnation.165 Motivated by this weighty
existential fear, Jeffs facilitated the denial of modern medical treatment for
the sick and injured as well as the forceful separation of children from their
parents.166 Even after her father was imprisoned, Jeffs still obeyed his every
command and perpetuated the fraudulent misuse of government entitlements
161. Johnny Masilela, Why Vlok is still apologizing, IOL (Sept. 6, 2015),
https://www.iol.co.za/sundayindependent/why-vlok-is-still-apologising1911387#.VfF5cNKqqko [https://perma.cc/FE9A-GPYJ]; Wally Mbhele, The
Semantic Battles of Adriaan Vlok, MAIL & GUARDIAN, Oct. 17, 1997,
https://mg.co.za/article/1997-10-17-the-semantic-battles-of-adriaan-vlok; Virginia
Boswell, Adriaan Vlok and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, S. AFR.
HISTORY ONLINE 4-6 (Dec. 7, 2012) https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/adriaanvlok-and-truth-and-reconciliation-commission.
162. Emma Reynolds, Daughter Of Notorious Cult Leader Opens Up On Year Of
Sickening
Sexual
Abuse,
NEWS.COM.AU
(Jan.
17,
2018),
https://www.news.com.au/lifestyle/real-life/true-stories/daughter-of-notorious-cultleader-opens-up-on-years-of-sickening-sexual-abuse/newsstory/fb4cda958c9260dc6247592961ea4806 [https://perma.cc/AP4L-FEQM].
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Cult, TODAY.COM, (Nov. 10, 2017), https://www.today.com/news/daughterpolygamist-warren-jeffs-tells-how-she-broke-free-his-t118665)
[https://perma.cc/GW96-WS7F]; Jeffs supra note 164 at 193, 238
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by the community.167 Subjects supported reduced blameworthiness for Jeffs
because her access to information and education was so limited that it seemed
perfectly understandable that she had a difficult time poking holes in any of
the church’s teachings. Furthermore, subjects were swayed by Jeffs’ deeprooted existential fear that disobedience would lead to punishment not only in
this life, but in the next, and thus, that obedience was morally justified.
The cases of Kenton, Vlok, and Jeffs all proved highly compelling to the
subjects because the offenders were all clearly indoctrinated, and their crimes
were clearly tied to their indoctrination. Still, these cases were not viewed as
favorably as Tenneson, Cabarga, and Heck because various features of their
lives made subjects doubt the reasonableness of their persistent commitment
to the cause. Kenton, for example, had exposure to the outside world on the
various missions he was sent on by Synanon’s leader;168 Vlok, on occasion,
had exposure to foreign media criticizing the views of the apartheid regime;
and Jeffs knew that her father was in prison and that the community was under
investigation by federal authorities.169 Subjects believed that these blips of
contact with the normative influences of the outside world should have sowed
enough doubt in the indoctrinated individuals to cause them to second guess
their criminal activity.

B. Indoctrination Cases That Seem More Blameworthy
At the other end of the indoctrination continuum were cases in which
subjects gave the offender little or no mitigation. These cases, for a variety of
reasons, were seen as significantly more blameworthy than those above, and
earned mitigation means of between 0.0 and 0.83. Nearly all had a mode of
0. That is, even the most compelling of these bottom tier cases were seen as
undeserving of even a minor mitigation. In some cases, the offender simply
did not appear to be sufficiently indoctrinated to blame his criminal conduct
on his indoctrination. In other cases, subjects expected the offender to reject
the new belief system prior to committing the crime or found that the
offender’s crime seemed so attenuated from the indoctrination that the
newfound belief system could not be seen as the rightful cause. Regardless
of the reasoning behind the limited mitigation afforded to each of these bottom
tier cases, the sheer fact of their variation from the top tier cases shows that
individuals can fairly easily adjudicate between indoctrinated offenders who
appear, at first glance, to be quite similar. The facility with which the subjects
drew distinctions between like cases shows the immense promise of an

167. Daphne Branham, Rachel Jeffs on Life after Polygamy and Why She Testified
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the
Blackmores,
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22,
2017),
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[https://perma.cc/3AH2-84E4].
168. Morantz, supra note 151.
169. Kyung Jim, supra note 163.
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indoctrination defense and speaks to the ease of operability of the defense
among the wider public.
One of the most clear-cut cases of no mitigation – receiving a mean of
0.0 on the blameworthiness reduction rubric – was that of Benjamin Murdock.
Murdock came of age at the apex of the civil rights era in the predominantly
black and impoverished Watts neighborhood of Los Angeles.170 While he had
vague intuitions of the racial injustices that pervaded 1960s America, he did
not have a coherent belief system about race relations.171 As an adult,
Murdock traveled to Washington, D.C., to attend the March on
Washington.172 After hearing Huey Newton and other Black Panthers speak,
Murdock became convinced that a race war was coming in the United States
and that he had to defend himself.173 One night while at a fast-food restaurant
in D.C. with friends, Murdock shot and killed two white unarmed Marines,
unprovoked.174 Murdock was convicted of murder and received a sentence of
twenty years to life.175 The subjects were wholly unpersuaded by the notion
that Murdock might have been indoctrinated. While he suffered a challenging
and deprived upbringing, Murdock never endured a formal indoctrination
program. No one was instilling a particular ideology in him or molding his
will to meet their needs. His frustration with racism could have been
manifested through commitment to non-violent organizing and civil
disobedience just as easily as it could have led to violent conduct. In that
sense, when Murdock became violent, the choice was his own.
Almost as unsympathetic to the subjects was the case of Ikuo Hayashi,
who committed such a serious crime that the surveyed students found his
behavior unredeemable. Hayashi was a highly respected heart surgeon who,
at age forty-three, turned to a religion called Aum Shinrikyo, which promised

170. U.S. v. Benjamin Murdock, 471, F.2d 923, 957–58 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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1968)
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EVE. STANDARD (Feb. 19, 1969), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPOCRECB-1969-pt3/pdf/GPO-CRECB-1969-pt3-8-2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5ULR6Q88].
175. PAUL HARRIS, BLACK RAGE CONFRONTS THE LAW 126, 127 (1997); Robert
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Neuroscientific Discoveries more than Philosophical Calisthenics!, 63 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 515, 518–19 (2015).
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absolution from one’s sins.176 Shortly thereafter, Hayashi renounced his
prestigious job and his family to devote himself to his new faith.177 He lived
in isolation with other members of Aum who blindly followed the teachings
of the leader of Aum, who they saw as powerful and divine.178 When the
leader instructed his followers to kill non-believers in order to rid the world
of bad karma, Hayashi and other Aum devotees complied.179 Convinced by
the feigned omniscience of their leader, they released lethal sarin gas into a
crowded subway, and over a thousand commuters were injured, while twelve
people died.180 Within hours of the attack, Hayashi recognized the errors of
his ways and renounced Aum.181 Despite having been subjected to an
intensive and personal program of indoctrination, Hayashi was seen by the
subjects as being fully blameworthy because of his age, sophistication, and
connections to the outside world at the time of his indoctrination. As a
surgeon, Hayashi had dedicated his life to saving lives, and yet he allowed
himself to become an instrument of mass killing. This transition seemed
unconscionable to the subjects, who felt that decades of deeply held moral
convictions could not be so quickly uprooted in pursuit of a heinous act.
Garnering just slightly more sympathy than Hayashi was Ethan Couch,
who readers might recognize as the young man who attempted to use the
defense of “affluenza” – excessive wealth undermining one’s ability to be
influenced by the threat of punishment – to reduce his sentence after he was
charged with four counts of intoxication manslaughter.182 Couch was the only
child of wealthy parents who used money to smooth over inappropriate and
illegal behavior.183 Couch was given an enormous amount of independence
as a child, such that he drove himself to school alone at age thirteen, dropped
out of school at fourteen, and lived alone at age sixteen, which allowed him

176. HARUKI MURAKAMI, UNDERGROUND: THE TOKYO GAS ATTACK AND THE
JAPANESE PSYCHE 9 (Vintage, 2013)
177. Id.
178. Id. at 10–11.
179. ROBERT JAY LIFTON, DESTROYING THE WORLD TO SAVE IT: AUM SHINRIKYÕ,
APOCALYPTIC VIOLENCE, AND THE NEW GLOBAL TERRORISM 106–300 (2000).
180. IAN READER, RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 114 (2000).
181. Hiroshi Matsubara, Aum Rulings Set Line Between Life And Death, JAP.
TIMES (Aug. 11, 2000), https://culteducation.com/group/826-aum-sect-shokoasahara/667-aum-rulings-set-line-between-life-and-death.html
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to throw many drug- and alcohol-fueled parties without adult supervision.184
After one such party, Couch, whose blood alcohol was at three times the legal
limit, drove his truck into oncoming traffic, killing four people and paralyzing
another.185 Subjects were not persuaded by Couch’s argument that having
been raised by wealthy parents, with no rules and no conception of causal
behavior, he was unable to appreciate the inappropriateness of his conduct.
Instead, subjects argued that Couch had ample opportunities to be different
than his parents. He went to school until he was fourteen, so presumably, he
had friends who were brought up differently, and learned from teachers who
taught a more normative moral code.186 He broke the law not because of some
deeply implanted belief that governmental authority should be rejected as a
false construct, but rather as a performance of social stature and daredevil
behavior for his peers.
Only slightly more persuasive was the case of Cragg Hardaway, who
despite being raised in a loving stable home, sought out gang life at age
fourteen because of its promise of money, status, and privilege.187 While over
time, he became convinced of the power of some of the older members of the
gang, this reverence was largely a product of the significant amount of money
the gang was pulling in from drug sales.188 Still, when the gang ordered
Hardaway to kill an eleven-year-old fellow member, he complied, fearing that
disobeying the gang’s older leaders would force him out of the group.189
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Hardaway was convicted of murder and received a sixty-year sentence.190
Hardaway was not compelling to the subjects because he had no need to
follow through on the gang’s orders to kill, and yet he persisted as a result of
avarice and a desire for respect. Instead of being roped into the gang by
coercion or manipulation, he was enticed by the trappings of gang life.191 He
ignored his parents’ pleas to leave the gang even as his gang activities led him
to multiple run-ins with the police.192 The subjects thus viewed him as entirely
blameworthy for his conduct.
Similar to Hardaway, John Gotti Jr. was not persuasive to the subjects
because he voluntarily joined the mafia because he was attracted to its culture,
not because its older members coerced him in any way.193 The young Gotti,
whose father was the boss of the Gambino crime family, was seduced by the
thrill of crime and the honor culture that shaped social life inside the
organization.194 At age eighteen, he joined the group after spending several
months sitting in a mafia safehouse watching their activities.195 As he grew
older, though, Gotti became critical of the mafia life he had once romanticized
after witnessing the murder or imprisonment of dozens of his friends.196
Subjects did not find Gotti to be a strong case deserving of mitigation because
it seemed likely that Gotti was never actually indoctrinated. Gotti’s
involvement in the Gambino crime family could be ascribed to his desire for
connection with a father who had neglected him as a child far more than it
could be to any sort of forced alteration of his belief system.
Slightly more compelling than Gotti, but still hardly deserving of any
sort of mitigation, was the case of Althanese Seromba, a Catholic priest who
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lived in Rwanda during the 1990s Rwandan genocide.197 Seromba was a
member of the country’s majority ethnic group, the Hutus, who controlled the
government and frequently instigated conflict with the minority ethnic group,
the Tutsis.198 Over the radio, the ruling Hutu party encouraged fellow Hutus
to kill Tutsis, who they claimed were trying to overthrow the government.199
Despite being highly educated and devoutly professing a faith that decried
violence of all kinds, Seromba was convinced by these repeated government
messages.200 Seromba organized the mass murder of 2000 Tutsis by inviting
them into his church to seek shelter and bulldozing it with them inside.201
Subjects were unwilling to grant Seromba any mitigation because they
believed that Seromba, as an educated person, should have known to doubt
the credibility of the radio messages. Further, as a priest, he was taught that
God, not the government, was the highest authority, and this religious
understanding should have brought him to understand that the killing of even
one other person abhorrent. Finally, like Hayashi, the gravity of Seromba’s
crime motivated against a finding of blameworthiness. Orchestrating the
death of 2000 people was inexcusable no matter how compelling the panicked
voices of Hutu broadcasters made the cause against the Tutsis seem.
Equally unpersuasive was the case of Kat McDonough who, at age
eighteen, moved in with her possessive and brooding twenty-eight-year-old
boyfriend.202 Over a short period of time, McDonough became completely
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submissive to him as the pair pretended to be characters in a sexual fantasy
with strong violent undertones.203 When her boyfriend demanded that
McDonough find him a new sex slave, McDonough invited a female
colleague over to their apartment.204 After McDonough’s colleague resisted
McDonough’s boyfriend’s advances, he killed the young woman by
strangulation while McDonough stood by and made no attempt to
intervene.205 The boyfriend then raped the colleague’s corpse, and
McDonough later helped him hide the body.206 After her arrest, however,
McDonough expressed great remorse.207 Despite the intensive, one-on-one
quasi-indoctrinating relationship between McDonough and her boyfriend,
McDonough was seen as completely blameworthy. Though the relationship
was undoubtedly emotionally manipulative, and the age difference between
her and her boyfriend rendered an unequal power dynamic, McDonough
likely was sufficiently sophisticated, educated, and independent to reject her
boyfriend’s sinister sexual desires. Her boyfriend had explicitly stated on
several occasions that he had a strong desire to hurt women, and yet,
McDonough brought a colleague into his control.208
Finally, the
circumstances by which McDonough may have been indoctrinated were less
than compelling. While she was under immense pressure from her boyfriend
to comport herself a certain way in his presence, she was never subjected to a
program of formal indoctrination in which her movement was restricted, nor
was she cut off from contact with the outside world. The subjects expected
that someone in her situation would have resisted the crime-causing aspects
of his indoctrination and broken off the relationship.
All of these most blameworthy offenders demonstrate a general tendency
among the subjects evaluating indoctrination cases to disfavor cases where:
(1) the offender did not adopt a clear ideology or belief system; (2) the
offender did not have an active indoctrinator; (3) the offender’s crime was
particularly heinous; or (4) the offender seemed to be motivated by a desire to
maintain a personal relationship rather than a coercively implanted belief
system. Overall, it seems clear that support for an indoctrination defense or
mitigation is not based upon an offender falling within a general category of
cases. A defense or mitigation may be held appropriate in one indoctrination
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case yet seen as entirely inappropriate in another case that would seem similar
in many respects. Particularly offensive to the subjects were those cases in
which the offender voluntarily joined an organization he knew to be criminal
and then committed a crime on the group’s behalf. To offer a person like
Benjamin, who decided almost on a whim to shoot an unarmed Marine
because he thought a race war was coming, anything near the same sort of
mitigation as a person like Cabarga, who was abused and kept in isolation for
years, seems deeply unfair. Thus, people’s intuitive judgments about
mitigation or defense for indoctrination appear to be somewhat complex.
What is the analysis that drives the blameworthiness assessment in
indoctrination cases? Is it possible to articulate criteria that is most relevant
to such an assessment?

VII. AN ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING LIABILITY IN
INDOCTRINATION CASES
Based on the discussions that emerged among the subjects while
determining what mitigation should be afforded to each individual, we
generated five questions that we think are essential to ask in determining
whether a case deserves a defense or significant mitigation because of
indoctrination. These questions were not given directly to subjects, but they
did perhaps inform their decision-making to the extent that the subjects
considered these issues on their own accord. To flesh out the requirements of
each element, we include the narratives of real cases of indoctrination –
typically drawn from the case narratives discussed in the previous section – to
illustrate the factors pinpointed by each of the five key analytic issues.
Because indoctrination comes in many forms, and impacts its subjects in
different ways, these vignettes of the lives of indoctrinated individuals can
help to clarify the factors that are most important to take into account at each
step of the analysis. We also include accounts of the lives of other individuals
whose experiences might appear similar to the sympathetic indoctrination
cases, but nonetheless ought to be ineligible for a defense or significant
mitigation. Drawing distinctions between eligible and ineligible offenders at
each stage in the analytic framework helps establish and illustrate the limits
on the depth and reach of an indoctrination mitigation or defense.

A. Indoctrinated?
There obviously can be no basis for an indoctrination mitigation or
defense unless the offender was in fact indoctrinated:

Q1. Was the offender indoctrinated to adopt beliefs or values that
were not his or her own?
In answering this question, a decision-maker might investigate a number
of different factors: Did the offender act in a way or freely express beliefs or
values that conflicted with his “previous self”? Did the offender act in ways
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against his own best self-interests in furtherance of the indoctrinated beliefs
and values? Was the offender subject to some of the classic mechanisms of
coercive indoctrination: isolation, deprivation, control, repeated reeducation,
compelled self-criticism, or renaming? Was the offender indoctrinated by
another person or group, which truly intended to change his belief system?
Did the offender subsequently revert to his “previous self”? If so, did he
express genuine remorse about his offense?
Exemplifying this requirement is the case of Tenneson, discussed above,
wherein a midwestern farm boy was indoctrinated by the Chinese military to
become a devoutly committed member of the Communist project.209
Tenneson demonstrates the essence of the indoctrination process – an
enormous shift in belief systems that renders the subject a wholly different
person.210 Tenneson became the face of Chinese communist propaganda,
decrying the United States and its allies. When offered repatriation to the
United States, Tenneson refused, and when his mother came to visit him,
Tenneson declined to see her.211 His decision to join the Communist front
was hardly spontaneous or self-directed, but rather was the result of months
of extraordinary indoctrination from the Chinese military to best serve
Communist interests.212 The formative understandings and fundamental
convictions that had motivated his desire to go to war in the first place were
effectively erased and replaced with a reimagining of the world in direct
contrast with his previous belief system.
In contrast to Tenneson, the Benjamin case presents us with
circumstances in which one could conclude that the offender was not really
indoctrinated, at least not in a way and to an extent that deserves a defense or
substantial mitigation.
Murdock Benjamin was neither part of an
indoctrinating organization nor under the influence of a coercive and
manipulative individual.213 A young man, with a hardscrabble upbringing in
a predominantly poor, minority neighborhood, Benjamin seemed to have been
drawn to the Black Panthers and Huey Newton, but there is little indication
that Benjamin’s consumption of these various activists’ works made him
someone different than his “authentic self.”214 If Benjamin was considered to
be indoctrinated, then anyone persuaded by any polemic work or anyone with
a difficult upbringing could call themselves indoctrinated. We are hesitant to
permit such a broad conceptualization of the defense. While Benjamin’s
background undoubtedly made him ripe for the seeds of extremist ideologies,
there was no formal or informal mechanism of indoctrination for such ideas
to be sowed. Instead, as a product of his own frustrations and rightful
indignations about the black experience in 1960s America, Benjamin, of his
own accord, became certain that there was going to be a race war in the United
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

See supra text accompanying notes 1–14.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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States. These ideas about the world hardly resembled an indoctrinated, cogent
belief system, but rather formed a few loose strands of ideas that Benjamin
clung to in order to organize his life.

B. Should Have Resisted the Indoctrination?
Even if one concludes that the offender was in fact indoctrinated, no
significant mitigation or defense is appropriate if the offender could
reasonably have been expected to have resisted the indoctrination.

Q2. Could we have reasonably expected the offender to have avoided
or resisted the indoctrination? Where the offender volunteered for
indoctrination, could we have reasonably expected the offender to
have anticipated the ideology’s propensity for criminality?
In answering this question, the decision-maker might inquire into such
factors as: How old was the offender at the time of the indoctrination? Had
the offender developed an authentic self before the indoctrination process?
Did other similarly situated persons successfully resist the same indoctrination
process? Was the source of the indoctrination a planned and organized
indoctrination program, an informal ad hoc program, an inadvertent effect, or
simply exposure to the existing environment? If the offender volunteered for
the group or program doing the indoctrination, did he or she know that the
indoctrination would lead to the offense? Was the offender more vulnerable
than others to indoctrination for reasons that were not his fault?
The issue hinges on two distinct features of indoctrination: severity and
deceptiveness. To the first point, indoctrination is most powerful and difficult
to resist where the indoctrinator employs rigorous and methodical techniques
to ensure that the subject is wholly and unquestioningly committed to the
indoctrinator’s agenda. To the second point, indoctrination is particularly
hard to avoid where the subject does not know she is being indoctrinated
because her indoctrinator is deceptive in his recruiting and reeducation
methods. In regard to severity, one must appreciate that indoctrination is not
an on-off switch but rather a continuum of depth and control. Even after one
is initially indoctrinated, a well-organized program will continue to work to
deepen and “consolidate” the indoctrination. Psychologist Robert Baron has
pointed to three stages: the “softening-up stage,” the “internalization stage,”
and the “consolidation stage.”215 Each phase features powerful mechanisms
of control that increasingly diminish the subject’s autonomy and lucidity,
rendering him increasingly unable to resist his indoctrinator’s demands or
question his indoctrinator’s motives.216
The Vlok case presents us with a strong example of the first aspect of this
indoctrination inquiry. Every influence and institution Adriaan Vlok

215. Baron, supra note 116 at 238, 240–42.
216. Id.
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encountered in his life in apartheid South Africa indoctrinated him to believe
in a very particular, racialized vision of the world.217 Educated in a state-run
school with a curriculum designed to spread the state’s notion of white
supremacy, raised by parents who themselves were avowed segregationists,
and trained by a military that taught him to quash any insurrection in the black
community, Vlok’s understanding of the world was highly warped by his
bigoted and culturally homogenous upbringing.218 Like many other young
white men during apartheid, Vlok was singled out as the ideal subject of a
state-run indoctrination program geared toward promoting apartheid. To
resist would have been extremely difficult as every feature of his life was
operating in service of the inculcation of these ideas, and there was no
inclination that any of these hateful beliefs were wrong. With his adolescence
shrouded by a monolithic way of seeing the world and deprived of access to
information with which he could challenge these deeply ingrained views, it
was difficult, if not impossible, for Vlok to resist indoctrination.
Conversely, the Seromba case provides an example of a person who
should have been able to resist indoctrination given his age, education, and
religious convictions as well as the significant degree of separation between
him and his indoctrinators.219 At the start of the Rwandan genocide, Seromba
was a priest who served as a parish leader for a mixed congregation of Hutus
and Tutsis, so he initially rejected the extreme and violent claims made by
Rwandan authorities.220 One could easily conclude that Seromba should have
resisted the indoctrination, given his sophistication and strongly grounded
beliefs. Unlike Vlok, who was young and naïve at the time of his
indoctrination, Seromba possessed deeply rooted moral convictions and
significant knowledge about the world that should have enabled him to
disregard the violent messages of the Hutu officials. Furthermore, while Vlok
faced his indoctrinators every day in all facets of his life, Seromba only
encountered his indoctrinators as periodic voices over the radio. Though the
messages of the Hutu authorities were far more intense and panicked than
those of the apartheid officials with whom Vlok dealt, they also called for
much more extreme commitments that should have encouraged Seromba to
second guess their legitimacy. Vlok, as with most whites, did not know the
people who lived on the other side of Apartheid as individuals.221 But
Seromba knew many of his victims on an intimate basis: he heard their
confessionals, officiated their weddings and baptized their babies.222 Ignoring
his education, his religious convictions, and his earlier skepticism, Seromba’s
inability to resist indoctrination seems indefensible.
217. See supra text accompanying 153–58.
218. See supra text accompanying 153–58.
219. See supra text accompanying 194–98.
220. See supra text accompanying 194–98.
221. Edwin Musoni, Seromba, the Priest Who Rolled a Bulldozer on His
Congregation,
NEW
TIMES,
Jan.
11,
2014,
https://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/72251 [https://perma.cc/6Y99-YN4D].
222. Id.
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The second analytic requirement noted above introduces the special
problem of the offender who is in fact effectively indoctrinated but who
volunteers for the program or group in which the indoctrination occurs.223 A
compelling example of this type of indoctrination is the case of Leslie Van
Houten, who as a teenager was indoctrinated by Charles Manson to become a
part of the Manson Family.224 Prior to her indoctrination, Van Houten had
lived a relatively peaceful life in a bucolic southern California community
with intensely religious parents.225 She found her way to San Francisco in the
summer of 1968, where she met a group of young people known as the
Manson Family.226 These individuals immediately recognized her as a
vulnerable young person and coaxed her to join their ranks.227 Naïve and
seeking a sense of belonging, Van Houten was enticed by their message of a
community founded on love, music, and the worshipping of Charles Manson,
a man widely regarded to have Christ-like powers.228 At no point during her
indoctrination was any mention made of violence, race wars, or any of the
criminal behavior that would come to define the group’s mission.229 By the
time Manson changed his tune and began to suggest the murder of Hollywood
elites, Van Houten had been with the group for over a year and was so smitten
by Manson’s charisma and convinced of the righteousness of his view of the
world that she could not resist his commands.230 Her experience is the
archetypal example of indoctrination by deception as she had no idea of the
sinister intentions of the group until it was too late.
On the other side, an incident of non-deceptive voluntary indoctrination
would be the case of Cragg Hardaway, who left the safety and comfort of his
home in order to join a street gang, knowing of its criminal tendencies.231
Hardaway did not join the gang seeking community or emotional support;
223. ROSE DUNCAN, MANSON’S GIRL: THE TRUE STORY OF LESLIE VAN HOUTEN
(2016).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. See KARLENE FAITH, THE LONG PRISON JOURNEY OF LESLIE VAN HOUTEN:
LIFE BEYOND THE CULT (2001).
228. Justin Parkinson, The Terrible Charisma of Charles Manson, BBC NEWS
(Nov.
20,
2017),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-42051402
[https://perma.cc/J6W6-QBB8].
229. See FAITH, supra note 224.
230. See Sophie Gilbert, The Real Cult of Charles Manson, ATLANTIC (Nov. 20,
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2017/11/the-real-cult-ofcharles-manson/546206/ [https://perma.cc/NM4T-U4AV];CHARLES WATSON, CEASE
TO EXIST: A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT OF INDOCTRINATION INTO THE MANSON FAMILY
(2019).
231. See Sharon Cohen, Locked Up at 14 For an Infamous Murder, Living With
Regrets and Dreaming of a Future, STAR NEWS ONLINE (Dec. 18 2007, 12:01AM),
https://www.starnewsonline.com/news/20071218/locked-up-at-14-for-an-infamousmurder-living-with-regrets-and-dreaming-of-a-future
[https://perma.cc/GC9CKLGL].
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instead, he joined the organization precisely because he was enthralled with
the prospect of the social status and material gains that would come as a result
of his association with this criminal element.232 His actions seem to indicate
that he would have committed crimes on the group’s behalf before even
becoming a full-fledged member. Unlike Van Houten, Hardaway would
likely not pass this second criteria because he had direct knowledge of the
group’s criminality but volunteered to join it anyway. He could have easily
avoided or resisted the indoctrination, but instead sought it out as a means of
attaining full-fledged membership in what he perceived as a powerful group.

C. Indoctrination Caused Offense?
Even if an offender is indoctrinated, and even if he or she could not
reasonably have been expected to have avoided or resisted the indoctrination,
the offender cannot persuasively claim a defense or significant mitigation for
criminal conduct unless the indoctrination did in fact cause the offense.

Q3. Might the offender have committed the offense even if he or she
had not been indoctrinated, and did the offense naturally and logically
follow from the indoctrinated beliefs and values?
In making these assessments, a decision-maker might inquire, for
example, into whether the offender committed some other offenses that did
not naturally and logically follow from the indoctrinated beliefs and values,
or whether the nature of his or her pre-indoctrination beliefs and values played
a significant role in causing the offense.
A fairly clear-cut case in which the indoctrination seems to have caused
the offense is that of Kenton, where young Lance Kenton was raised to be an
unquestioning devotee of Charles Dederich, leader of the rehabilitation cult
Synanon.233 Kenton became convinced that he had to do everything he could
to ensure the continued success of Synanon. The crime for which Kenton was
ultimately charged – the placement of a rattlesnake in the mailbox of a lawyer
who was suing Synanon – was engineered entirely by Dederich and was aimed
exclusively at promoting the continued existence of the group.234 Kenton
committed the crime at age twenty after ten years of intensive indoctrination
that led him to believe that the word of Dederich was unquestionable, and the
world outside of Synanon was terrifying and dangerous. Kenton’s
indoctrination was thus a clear but-for cause of his ultimate crime. Without
having been so strongly influenced by Dederich and his peers at Synanon,
Kenton likely never would have attempted to murder another person.
On the other hand, a person may well be highly indoctrinated, but their
crime may be one that does not logically follow from the indoctrinated

232. Id.
233. See The History of Synanon and Charles Dederich, supra note 151.
234. Id.

2020]

INDOCTRINATION AS A DEFENSE TO CRIME

787

system’s beliefs and values. Imagine if Tenneson, Volk, or Kenton committed
rape or stole property of another for their own purposes. We would hardly
think their indoctrination would qualify them for a defense or mitigation.

D. Should Have Reverted before Offense?
Even if the offender has been indoctrinated, could not reasonably have
been expected to have resisted or avoided the indoctrination, and the
indoctrination caused the offense, the decision-maker nonetheless may
conclude that in some situations the offender should have rejected the
indoctrinated beliefs and values on their own before ever reaching the point
of having to decide whether to commit the offense.

Q4. After being indoctrinated, could we have reasonably expected the
offender, before the time of the offense, to have rejected on his or her
own the crime-causing aspects of the indoctrination?
Here, it is useful to examine such factors as: How much of a delay was
there between the indoctrination and the offense? Was the indoctrination
being continually reinforced during the delay? Was the offender aware of
persons who did not share the indoctrinated views? Could the offender
interact with such people? How old was the offender at the time of the
offense? Had the offender reached full adult maturity? Did the ideology of
the indoctrination program shift after the offender voluntarily joined? Or, did
the program’s ideology turn out to be different from that which the offender
had sincerely anticipated?
An example of a case in which the offender could not reasonably have
been expected to revert on their own as they got older is that of Heck.235
Alfons Heck was indoctrinated as a child in Nazi Germany, and nearly
everyone in his life was in support of Hitler’s party. Throughout his
adolescence, at no point did Heck have the opportunity to reject the received
wisdom he had inherited from his family members, classmates,
schoolteachers, Hitler Youth leaders, and media personalities.236 Reverting
from this monolithic, all-consuming vision of the world as he got older would
have been very difficult, if not impossible.
In contrast, it may commonly be the case that an offender is genuinely
indoctrinated but with the passage of time – as she grows older and more
mature, as she is exposed to contrary beliefs, or as she comes to see that the
indoctrinated ideology leads to criminality – we would expect her to abandon
the indoctrinated beliefs and values on her own. Consider the case of Kat
McDonough who, at age eighteen, entered into an overwhelming, unhealthy
relationship with an older man.237 As the relationship became increasingly

235. HECK, supra note 96.
236. HECK, supra note 96.
237. Allen, supra note 199.
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abusive, and as it became increasingly clear that it was leading to violence
against others, one might have expected that McDonough would have started
reevaluating the value system her boyfriend had encouraged her to adopt. But
she failed to do so, even as her mother encouraged her to be wary of the man’s
propensity for violence. When the older man commanded her to find a second
woman for him to abuse, McDonough worked diligently over several months
to fulfill his wish, even though she knew his intention was to hurt the
woman.238 Her continuing exposure to the outside world in her day to day
life, her ample avenues of escape, and her increasing knowledge of her
boyfriend’s dangerously violent tendencies made her failure to resist his
indoctrination all the more implausible.
A twist on the scenario in which the subject might abandon her
indoctrinated beliefs is that in which the subject has voluntarily joined a group
that appears deceptively pro-social only to find out that the group harbors truly
dark, criminal aims. If such a subject were to pass Question Two on the
grounds that she was so thoroughly deceived by the group that she could not
have resisted indoctrination, or that the group’s antisocial aims were not at all
clear at the time of indoctrination, she would be up again for analysis in this
section in order to assess whether she should have abandoned the
indoctrinating beliefs once she knew they were nefarious.
To follow our analysis from Question Two, in the case of Van Houten,
who was deceptively indoctrinated into the Manson Family under the guise of
love, peace, and music, Question Four would ask whether Van Houten should
have rejected Charles Manson’s beliefs once she discovered that he was
plotting murders and trying to instigate a race war. While Van Houten could
argue that she was so in love with Manson, and so sedated by near constant
consumption of drugs, being asked to brutally kill a celebrity likely would
have shocked even the most unhinged member of the Manson Family. This
is particularly true for Van Houten, who was raised in a devoutly religious
family and who was attracted to Manson initially precisely because he
advocated for love, peace, and an end to war.
In fact, Van Houten testified after the murder for which she was charged
as a conspirator that she felt immense trepidation when she was asked to hold
down the female victim while the victim’s husband was being stabbed to
death. Van Houten then hid in the hallway, unable to bring herself to
participate in the murder of the wife. Such a strong, visceral reaction to the
violent deaths of these two individuals would indicate that Van Houten was
uncomfortable with the idea of murder long before the act took place and
perhaps as far back as Manson’s first mention of his plan. In light of these
reasons, we would expect Van Houten to reject Manson’s violent vision,
motivated by her deeply embedded conviction that killing another person is
wrong.

238. See Roberts, supra note 200.
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E. Despite Indoctrination, Should Have Resisted the Offense?
Even if an offender could not reasonably have been expected to have
resisted the indoctrination or reverted on their own after indoctrination, and
even if the indoctrination caused the offense, the offender ought not be entitled
to a defense or significant mitigation if, when immediately faced with
commission, we could have reasonably expected the offender to have resisted
committing the offense, especially if it is a serious offense.

Q5. At the time of the offense, could we have reasonably expected the
offender to have resisted committing the offense despite the
indoctrination?
The decision-maker ought to examine both the seriousness of the offense
and the effectiveness of the indoctrination: What was the seriousness level of
the offense? What was the level of success and the depth of the
indoctrination? Does the offender genuinely believe that what he is doing is
good for the victim? Is good for society?239
A strong example of an individual who could not have resisted the
commission of the offense despite indoctrination is Rachel Jeffs, whose
kidnapping and child neglect crimes occurred directly as a result of her
religious indoctrination. Having never known a world outside of FLDS,
Jeffs’s commitment to the group and her failure to disobey its doctrine seems
in line with what is known about persons raised in groups with totalizing
ideologies. Jeffs’s failure to resist the crimes she ultimately committed is the
product of a deeply ingrained understanding of the existential importance of
every task undertaken in service of the community’s family values.
In contrast, Hayashi is a case in which one could reasonably have
expected the offender to have overcome the indoctrination to have resisted
committing a horrendous offense. His desire to join the group seemed
perfectly rational, and his overwhelming guilt and grief from injuring people
in a car accident might well explain why he was so vulnerable to
indoctrination by a religious sect in which one could cleanse one’s sins in a
glorious afterlife. But when faced with executing a sarin attack on hundreds

239. Such a belief probably ought not provide the basis for a complete defense.
The offender cannot substitute his notion of what is good and desirable for society’s.
But such a belief may make the offender less blameworthy than the similarly situated
offender who commits the same offense without such a belief in the goodness of his
offense conduct.
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of innocent people in a subway station,240 he could reasonably have expected
to have reevaluated his new ideology.241

VIII. A PROPOSED STATUTORY FORMULATION
As this analytic framework captures the important points in assessing an
indoctrinated offender’s blameworthiness, these five inquiries can be
incorporated into a workable statutory provision. Consider the following
proposal:
(1) Defense. A person is entitled to a defense if he or she:
(a) was indoctrinated by another to adopt beliefs or values that
were not his or her own, [Q1]
(b) committed the offense because of such indoctrination,
[Q3] and
(c) could not reasonably have been expected to have:
(i) resisted the indoctrination, or anticipated the
ideology’s propensity for criminality, [Q2]
(ii) before the time of the offense, rejected on his or
her own the crime-causing aspects of the
indoctrination, [Q4] and
(iii) at the time of the offense, resisted its commission
despite the indoctrination. [Q5]

240. Hayashi might also lose the defense under Q4: there was a substantial
planning period between his initial indoctrination and commission of the offense
during which the horrendous nature of the planned attack was obvious, thus one might
conclude that he could reasonably have been expected to have rejected his
indoctrination on his own. The closer the attack came, the clearer the enormity of the
harm and the greater our expectations of him to stop. Hayashi could easily be seen as
failing both Q4 and Q5. As this illustrates, an offender may lose a defense by failing
to meet several, or all, of the five requirements.
241. Similar is the case of Dominic Ongwen, who was kidnapped as a child and
indoctrinated into becoming a child soldier in Uganda. It is not hard to understand
how a boy could have been indoctrinated into becoming a ruthless warrior. But over
more than a decade Ongwen rose ever higher in the chain of command. In time he
became the man who was kidnapping children and raping girls. As a victim of this
type of abuse, Ongwen seems to have been in a position to resist committing the
offenses. See Prosecutor v. Ongwen, ICC-02/04-01/15-1562, Judgment (July 17,
2019), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2019_03885.PDF; Complicating
Victims and Perpetrators in Uganda: On Dominic Ongwen, JUSTICE AND
RECONCILIATION
PROJECT
(July
31,
2008),
http://www.justiceandreconciliation.org/publications/field-notes/2008/complicatingvictims-and-perpetrators-in-uganda-on-dominic-ongwen-fn-vii/
[https://perma.cc/F59Y-EYQP]; see generally Helene Cooper, A Mission to Capture
or Kill Joseph Kony Ends, Without Capturing or Killing, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/15/world/africa/joseph-kony-mission-ends.html
[https://perma.cc/RB6U-4WHN].
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(2) Mitigation. A person who satisfies the requirements of subsections
(1)(a) and (1)(b) but who fails to meet one or more of the requirements of
(1)(c) may be eligible for a reduction of one offense grade if the jury finds
that, while the person should have resisted or rejected as required by
subsections (1)(c), it was readily understandable why the person failed to do
so. Alternatively, upon such a finding the jury may recommend that the
sentencing judge provide some lesser mitigation.
(3) Burden of Proof. The defendant shall have the burden of proving this
defense or mitigation by a preponderance of the evidence.

A. Indoctrination – (1)(a)
The proposal adopts a broad view of what may constitute indoctrination,
which it can afford to do because of the very specific demands of the leader
subsections. With this broad definition in (1)(a), we create space for a wide
array of indoctrinating scenarios. The offender need not have been
indoctrinated by a particular, identifiable individual or institution. In some
circumstances, the subject may be drawn into a particular belief system by a
charismatic leader,242 but a personal relationship with the indoctrinator is not
necessary. In cases of widespread, societal indoctrination, for example, a
subject’s unquestioning dedication to the ruling party emerges organically out
of the litany of social institutions, such as schools and the state media, that
serve as indoctrinating intermediaries between party leadership and everyday
citizens.243
Account is taken of the actor’s unique situation, not only in terms of the
features of his or her indoctrination but also in terms of the unique tangible
and intangible factors that differentiate one actor from another. As indicated
in the above section, the locus of the indoctrination analysis is the character
of the indoctrinated subject. In determining the existence of indoctrination,
we must consider the degree to which the offender’s indoctrinated self
resembles their un-indoctrinated or de-indoctrinated self. To that end, unlike
in the defense of duress, the actor’s intangible features, such as age,
temperament, upbringing, and education level, might bear weight on the
extent to which the beliefs that motivated his crime were truly his own.

242. See generally Frank Bell, Larry Layton and Peoples Temple: Twenty-Five
Years Later, ALTERNATIVE CONSIDERATIONS OF JONESTOWN & PEOPLES TEMPLE
(Mar. 9, 2013), https://jonestown.sdsu.edu/?page_id=16973 [https://perma.cc/GF5ABKWQ] (explaining that Layton’s primary motivation throughout his criminal
conduct was to prove his loyalty to Peoples Temple leader, Jim Jones).
243. See generally Nico Voigländer & Hans-Joachim Voth, Nazi Indoctrination
and Anti-Semitic Beliefs in Germany, 112 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 26 (June 2015)
(explaining that Nazi schooling as well as radio and cinema propaganda were highly
effective at modifying public opinions, attitudes, and beliefs); ALFONS HECK, The
BURDEN OF HITLER’S LEGACY 49 (1988) (explaining that indoctrination of the youth
in Nazi Germany began on the very first day of elementary school: “We swallowed
our daily dose of nationalistic instruction as naturally as our morning milk”).
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The standard also implies a certain degree of intentionality in the
indoctrinating process. Some person, group, institution, or force must be
orchestrating the indoctrination with the intent to create an indoctrinated
subject. The intent need not be so particularized as to hold a certain subject
in mind during the indoctrinating process. Instead, it can be aimed loosely at
a particular demographic. For example, while the Nazi Party did not design
the Hitler Youth with the intent of indoctrinating a specific ten-year-old from
the Rhineland, that specific child can still claim to have been indoctrinated by
the Nazi Party through his involvement in the Hitler Youth.244
The intentionality requirement also prevents those cases where an
individual radicalizes himself from being eligible for the defense. For
example, Dylan Roof, the white supremacist who murdered nine black
churchgoers in Charleston, South Carolina, could not claim to have been
indoctrinated because, as he claimed, he read Wikipedia articles and news
reports about instances of “black-on-white crime” that convinced him that a
race war was necessary.245 While these materials may have led to his
becoming militant, they did not indoctrinate him because their authors’ aims
were not to make the reader a docile subject or to push him towards an
avowedly racist ideological position; they were purely to inform. We are wary
of incentivizing the adoption of criminally inclined and morally offensive
beliefs as a means of obtaining an affirmative defense, and feel that, as shown
in the above example, the intentionality requirement curtails this outcome.
The intentionality requirement also distinguishes indoctrination cases
from Stockholm Syndrome cases. Stockholm Syndrome manifests as a
traumatic bond between hostage and captor where the hostage’s desire to
survive supersedes his urge to loathe the person threatening his life.246
Psychologists Dee Graham and Edna Rawlings have explained that the
survival instinct is at the heart of the attachment in Stockholm Syndrome,
particularly where the hostage feels sympathetic towards the captor out of
relief that the captor is not going to kill him.247 These seemingly incongruous
positive feelings towards one’s captor, though, are not necessarily reflective
of a wholesale adoption of the captor’s beliefs. Instead, the performance of
unquestioning obedience is motivated largely by fear for one’s life, fear of
upsetting the captor, and fear of inciting further mistreatment rather than by
deep inculcation of new ideologies and the supplanting of a pre-hostage
self.248 Thus, any offense committed because of Stockholm Syndrome might

244. HECK, supra note 96, at 48.
245. Rebecca Hersher, What Happened When Dylann Roof Asked Google For
Information About Race?, NPR (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2017/01/10/508363607/what-happened-when-dylann-roof-asked-google-forinformation-about-race [https://perma.cc/NA73-JUFG].
246. DEE GRAHAM, LOVING TO SURVIVE: SEXUAL TERROR, MEN’S VIOLENCE, AND
WOMEN’S LIVES 59 (1994).
247. Id. at 60.
248. Id. at 21.
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more appropriately be examined under a duress defense than under
indoctrination.
A final issue that may arise in the context of this (1)(a) analysis is the
offender’s voluntary participation in the indoctrination. Where an offender
has freely joined a group with known criminal proclivities, this voluntary
association can weigh heavily on the question of his indoctrination. For
example, a person who joins a street gang, knowing the extent of its criminal
practices, would likely not be eligible for the defense. His choice to join the
gang might serve as an indication that even before he was indoctrinated, he
was willing to offend on their behalf, and he believed in their criminal aims.
Thus, there was no change in his belief system as a result of indoctrination.
The same cannot be said, however, where an offender has freely joined an
ostensibly non-violent, legitimate organization, seeking some sort of
enlightenment, commitment to social justice, or simply love and community,
and over time, the group gradually turns towards criminal behavior. Within
this context, the jury should take seriously the persuasive social and
psychological effects that membership in a totalizing group can have,
understanding that an organization with wholly licit ends can become criminal
over time, dragging along even its most law-abiding members with it. Here,
the subject of indoctrination undergoes an enormous change in beliefs such
that his earlier dedication to the group’s prosocial aims are leveraged to
generate dedication to the group’s later nefarious goals. Thus, with the
exception of those who voluntarily join notoriously criminal groups, a
person’s choice to be indoctrinated does not necessarily prevent him from
receiving the defense.

B. Causal Connection – (1)(b)
Section (1)(b) of the defense provides that the offender must have
committed the offense because of the indoctrination. That is, the offender
having been indoctrinated must have been a precursor to the offense but for
which the result in question would not have occurred. This is primarily an
inquiry that assesses (1) the strength of the ideological connection between
the crime and the offender’s indoctrination, and (2) whether the offense would
have been in the purpose or contemplation of the actor had he not been
indoctrinated.
If the offender was found not to be indoctrinated under the first prong of
the statute, a jury need not proceed further as the defense is per se inapplicable
to the offender. There is also a temporal limit on the (1)(b) analysis such that
even if the offender can be said to have been indoctrinated at some point, he
will not qualify for the defense if he was not fully indoctrinated at the time of
committing the offense. Any post hoc psychological effects of indoctrination
that emerge once a person has been de-indoctrinated will not be accepted as a
causal factor in this analysis.
In examining the ideological relationship between the offender’s
indoctrination and the offender’s crime, a jury may look at the extent to which
the crime was in service of some larger goal that the offender adopted through
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indoctrination and whether the indoctrinator ordered the offender to commit
the offense. Such a connection need not only be found in those cases where
the crime was in pursuit of loftier, ideological goals; the crime can simply be
in service of sustaining the group’s adherents. For example, crimes to
promote the financial survival of an indoctrinating organization or crimes
attendant to the management of daily life within such a group would be
sufficiently connected to qualify.249 If the connection between the
indoctrination and the crime appears attenuated, however, the offender likely
will not be granted a defense.
In assessing whether the offender might have committed the offense
even without the indoctrination, a jury might look towards the criminogenic
factors in the offender’s life, as well as her psychological health, prior to
indoctrination. For example, if an offender claimed to have been
indoctrinated by their “rotten social background,” as in Benjamin, even if
some kind of indoctrination could be shown, a defense or significant
mitigation would not be appropriate if it appears that the person would have
committed the crime anyway, because of the highly criminogenic factors that
shaped their upbringing. The idea is not to disregard the hardships these
individuals have faced, but rather to distinguish their situations from those
who have been intrusively and systemically indoctrinated to commit the
offense, so as to dilute the parameters of the defense.250

C. Reasonable Expectations – (1)(c)
Section (1)(c) of the defense functions as a limiting principle,
constraining the defense by having the jury make a normative assessment of
whether, taking all aspects of the offender’s capacity and situation into
account, we could have reasonably expected the offender to have avoided the
offense through any of three different paths: resisting the original
indoctrination, rejecting the indoctrinated beliefs and values on their own
before the time of the offense, and resisting commission of the offense despite
the indoctrination. Broadly, the three subsections of (1)(c) provide a timeline
of the indoctrination process, starting with the offender’s recruitment into the
group and ending with her commission of the crime.

1. Resisting Indoctrination – (1)(c)(i)
In determining whether the offender should have resisted the
indoctrination under subsection (1)(c)(i), the most important factor may be the
strength of the techniques employed on the subject. This analysis is best
249. See, e.g., Aron, supra note 150 (explaining members of the Synanon cult
committed theft, insurance fraud, and tax evasion in order to financially sustain the
group).
250. See generally David L. Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law, 49 S.
CAL. L. REV. 385 (1975) (outlining the need for the criminal justice system to consider
the life-altering hardships those who go through the system have most likely endured).
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conducted by assessing the extent to which the offender was isolated from
friends and family, deluded by strict information control, and subjected to a
flurry of emotional stimuli intended to disorient, exhaust, and confuse. Often,
the indoctrinator uses physical or sexual violence, or threat of such violence,
to heighten the stress levels of the recruit, cultivating pronounced
suggestibility. If evidence is presented establishing the forceful use of these
coercive techniques, the reasonable expectation that the subject could have
resisted indoctrination should be lowered.
Subsection 1(c)(i) is most likely to provide difficulty for an offender who
has been manipulated by an active indoctrinator – that is, where the offender
was indoctrinated after childhood by a particular group or individual, rather
than having been raised in a totalizing, insular community, family, or state.
Persons in the latter category may have less of an opportunity to resist
indoctrination because there was never anything available to them other than
the indoctrinated state.

2. Rejecting Crime-Causing Beliefs on Their Own – (1)(c)(ii)
Subsection (1)(c)(ii) asks whether the subject could have rejected on her
own the crime-causing aspects of the indoctrination before the time of the
offense.251 The degree to which the subject has internalized the group’s aims
or motives is inversely proportional to her ability to independently reject the
criminality of the group prior to the offense. Loyalty and adherence to the
group’s doctrine can become a means of survival that over time, subtly
inculcates the group’s ideas into the subject’s mind so that they appear to be
naturally occurring.252 In this case, the subject may find it difficult to reject
her indoctrinator’s crime-causing beliefs because she recognizes such beliefs
as originating from herself, and thereby entirely her own. If this process
happens quickly, intensely, and without any sort of rupture in the form of
access to conflicting views, relief from social pressure, or freedom from
isolation, it is highly challenging for the subject to reject her newly learned
belief system.
Rejecting crime-causing beliefs also requires the ability to anticipate
them and to cast a normative judgement on them as being anti-social and
condemnable. This jump can be difficult to make for those who have
completely lost the capacity to think for themselves or to imagine their group’s
belief system through the lens of an unaffiliated party. Thus, we would not
imagine those indoctrinated to believe that non-believers are all sinners and
destined for hell, to reject the criminal aspects of their beliefs as they would
feel no compulsion to obey the justice system, or to take seriously an
outsider’s perspective on their behavior. We may, however, expect rejection
of such views in cases where the individual has spent significant unsupervised
251. See generally Baron, supra note 116 at 242 (providing an overview of the
final two stages of indoctrination which serve as the last chance for an individual to
reject the crime-causing aspects of the indoctrination).
252. See id. at 244.

796

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

time and has been exposed to the group’s mythmaking process, such that he
might question the legitimacy of its views. Ultimately, the less he
conceptualizes himself as being part of the group, the more capable the subject
becomes of independent thought or resistance.

3. Resisting Commission – (1)(c)(iii)
Subsection (1)(c)(iii), which assesses whether the subject, despite her
indoctrination, should have resisted commission of the offense, asks both how
deep and committed she was to her indoctrinated values at the moment of the
crime as well as how serious the crime was. To the former point, a subject
who has established herself as a member of the group, via earnest and zealous
commitment to the group’s belief system, is less likely to resist commission
of the crime.253 Such a totalized subject would find it quite difficult to resist
any command from her indoctrinator because she believes such orders to have
divine origin, and her reasoning has been so warped that she can rationalize
even the most heinous crime as being in the service of her group’s more
important project. Despite having been powerfully manipulated, the subject
still believes herself to be wholly in charge of her own reasoning and decisionmaking capacity such that she comes to see the group’s aims not only as
righteous and necessary, but as her own. It would therefore be unreasonable
for the jury to expect that an individual with such a committed belief system
could disobey her indoctrinator’s wishes.
The decision-maker should also consider the severity of the crime.
Where the crime involves the loss of life or a disregard for the value of human
life, we can reasonably expect an indoctrinated offender to be more hesitant
and to at least reconsider the appropriateness of the conduct. Only the most
intense, effective forms of indoctrination would be able to convince an
offender to go through with crimes of a gruesome nature or characterized by
extreme moral turpitude. Perhaps ironically, evidence of an offender’s doubt,
repulsion, or skepticism about commission the offense or about the
indoctrinated beliefs motivating it may hurt the offender’s chances of a
defense or mitigation. Evidence that the offender had some awareness of the
gross impropriety of her act may lead jurors to conclude that we could more
reasonably have expected this indoctrinated offender to resist than one who
shows no such awareness.

D. Application of the Defense
The jury should proceed through the defense requirements in order from
(1)(a) to (1)(c)(iii). A person who does not meet the criteria established in
section (1)(a) is per se ineligible for the defense. A person who meets the
requirements in section (1)(a) but who does not meet the requirements in
section (1)(b) is also not eligible for the defense. That is, a person who was
indoctrinated but whose crime is seriously attenuated from his newly adopted
253. See id. at 241.
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values or belief system is ineligible for the defense. Occasionally, the facts
suggesting ineligibility under these two subsections may overlap. For
example, an allegedly indoctrinated member of a radically non-violent cult
would have no claim to the defense if he assaulted someone, while continuing
his membership in the cult, as his violence would clearly demonstrate that he
had failed to fully internalize the group’s most cherished beliefs and/or would
demonstrate that any indoctrination that had occurred was not the cause of his
violent offense.
If the offender is found to have been indoctrinated, and to have
committed the crime as a direct result of the indoctrination, the jury should
proceed to the section (1)(c) inquiry, asking what could reasonably have been
expected of the individual under the circumstances. If the jury determines that
the offender should have resisted the indoctrination, or on their own
subsequently rejected the indoctrinated ideology, or resisted commission of
the crime despite the indoctrination, but did not, then the offender is again
ineligible for a defense.
However, if the jury concludes that it was readily understandable why
the offender failed in what was reasonably expected of him under subsection
(1)(c), a mitigation of some sort remains possible. The jury might conclude,
“Though the offender should have behaved otherwise, we can appreciate why
he failed to do so.” This analysis would look to the key decisional moments
of the offender’s indoctrination and subsequent criminal behavior with an eye
to the totality of circumstances influencing his thoughts and behaviors at those
junctures. Where the external, indoctrinating influence on the offender is very
intense and intrusive, the jury might consider evaluating his actions as less
blameworthy, and where such an influence is less severe, the jury might deem
his actions more blameworthy. In the former case, the offender may be
eligible for a reduction in liability of one offense grade – typically half the
maximum sentence – or, if the jury decides, some lesser mitigation. The
reasoning here is that if an offender falls just short of complete blamelessness
on the continuum of blameworthiness, their appropriate degree of liability and
punishment is something just short of a complete defense.

E. Logistics of the Defense
Section (3) of the defense provides that the burden of proof is on the
defendant, and the standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence. We
do not narrow this defense to particular crimes or to particular stages of the
criminal proceedings. The defendant may plead the defense affirmatively at
any time. Some people may be concerned that providing an indoctrination
defense would invite too many jury acquittals in borderline cases, but this
concern may fail to appreciate two points.
First, as the Article has shown, one can construct an indoctrination
defense formulation that has a series of explicit limitations and exclusions. It
is not a completely open-ended defense that leaves the issue to the unguided
discretion of the jury. Second, whether one approves of it or not, jurors do in
fact have the power to nullify – that is, the power to return a not-guilty verdict
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even if the technical law on the books provides no defense in the case. This
means that providing the proposed indoctrination defense may actually avoid
improper acquittals rather than create them. A jury faced with an offender
who they see as of significantly reduced blameworthiness because of
indoctrination may choose the reduced-offense-grade option provided by the
indoctrination formulation rather than enter a nullifying verdict of acquittal.

IX. INDOCTRINATION AS A THIRD CATEGORY OF EXCUSE
We have suggested that the recognition of an indoctrination defense is
essential for a just system of criminal liability, but we have also conceded that
such a recognition represents a dramatic shift in scope of criminal law’s
inquiry: in the cases that satisfy the requirements of the defense, the criminal
law is crossing an important red line by taking account of how an offender
came to hold the beliefs and values that motivated the offense.
Having said that, however, it is nonetheless true that an indoctrination
defense has a logical place in criminal law’s existing conceptual framework.
Specifically, the indoctrination defense proposed here operates to the same
effect as other excuse defenses, which, like excuse defenses, contrasts sharply
with purpose and operation of justification defenses.254 That is, while the
indoctrination defense is new and different, it is fully analogous to, and fits
well within, the existing category of excuse defenses, and in contrast to
justification defenses.
Justification defenses, like lesser evils, self-defense, and law
enforcement authority, tell the community ex ante the criminal law’s rules of
conduct.255 Justifications authorize actors to do that which would otherwise
be an offense. Assaulting another person is normally a crime, except when
done as a necessary and proportionate means of defending oneself against an
unlawful attack.256 Justification defenses as a group represent an exception to
the offense definitions in defining prohibited conduct (or required conduct).
Excuse defenses, in contrast, operate ex post to adjudicate whether a violation
of the ex ante rules of conduct deserves liability and punishment.257
Justification defenses essentially decriminalize certain acts, while excuse
defenses exculpate certain actors.
Traditionally, there have been two kinds of excuse defenses: mistake
excuses and disability excuses.258 The first group, such as reliance upon an
official misstatement of law or mistake as to justification, are cases where an
254. See PAUL H. ROBINSON, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN CRIMINAL LAW 68–
125 (Clarendon Press 1997).
255. See id.; see also Mitchell N. Berman, Justification, Excuse, and Morality of
Law, 53 DUKE L. J. 1, 18 (2003).
256. See ROBINSON, supra note254; see also Berman, supra note 252 at 30.
257. Id.
258. See ROBINSON, supra note 254; see also ARLIE LOUGHNAN, MANIFEST
MADNESS: MENTAL INCAPACITY IN CRIMINAL LAW 21 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1st ed.
2012).
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actor is excused because his mistake is a reasonable one under the
circumstances.259 In the second group, disability excuses, such as insanity,
involuntary intoxication, or duress, the actor is excused despite acting very
unreasonably, because he or she suffers some cognitive or control dysfunction
sufficiently severe in its effect to render the offender blameless for the offense
conduct.260
As noted previously in Part I, the indoctrination defense does not qualify
as a disability excuse. At the time of the offense, the offender may be
suffering no cognitive or control dysfunction yet nonetheless may be entitled
to the indoctrination excuse. In broad perspective, the indoctrination defense
operates in the same way that other excuse defenses do: it provides ex post
exculpation even though the actor’s conduct violates the ex ante rules of
conduct. Thus, the indoctrination defense represents a third kind of excuse:
one based upon neither a reasonable mistake nor existing dysfunction at the
time of the offense but rather upon the actor’s lack of responsibility for the
beliefs and values that motivated the offense.
Appreciating the place of the indoctrination excuse in criminal law’s
conceptual framework has important practical implications.261 For example,
the rules of conduct, as in justification defenses, have the general public as
their audience and therefore benefit from clarity and objective criteria. In
contrast, the principles of adjudication, including excuse defenses, typically
have as their audience decision-makers such as judges and juries who can be
specially trained or instructed and can properly apply more complex and
subjective standards rather than objective rules. Thus, the open-ended
standards used in the proposed statutory formulation above might be
unsuitable in a justification defense or offense definition but are entirely
appropriate when used in the excuse defense. Indeed, most other excuse
defenses, both those of the reasonable mistake sort and those of the disability
sort, have similarly open-ended standards.262
Seeing that an indoctrination defense fits comfortably within the
category of excuse defenses also has important practical implications in the
operation of criminal law doctrine. For example, note that an actor can never
lawfully resist justified aggression, such as a lawful arrest, but can lawfully
resist excused aggression, such as a psychotic aggressor. Thus, because
indoctrination is an excuse defense, one can lawfully resist the attack of an
indoctrinated aggressor even though that aggressor will have a complete
defense to their aggressive conduct. Similarly, once we recognize an
indoctrination defense and understand it to operate as an excuse, then we are
in a better position to impose criminal liability on the indoctrinator for the
indoctrinated person’s offense. Model Penal Code section 2.06(2)(a), for

259.
260.
261.
262.

See ROBINSON, supra note 254; see also LOUGHNAN, supra note 258 at 21.
See ROBINSON, supra note 254; see also LOUGHNAN, supra note 258 at 21.
See ROBINSON, supra note 254 at 143–81.
Id. at 196-207.
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example, holds a person legally accountable for the conduct of another when
“he causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such conduct.”263

X. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
By failing to provide a defense or mitigation for an indoctrinationinduced offense, current criminal law fails in its obligation to do justice, which
frustrates both retributivist and utilitarian crime-control goals. The
availability of judicial sentencing discretion is insufficient to avoid the
problem because such discretion is not always available, it is too dependent
upon personal judgment of the individual judge rather than community views,
and it is likely to produce disparate results in similar cases, making criminal
liability depend upon the defendant’s good or bad luck in the judicial
assignment, rather than upon his crime and blameworthiness. Reliance upon
judicial discretion also ignores the need to develop an analytic framework to
control the availability of a defense, a project well beyond the scope of
sentencing or appellate judges adjudicating a single case.
Admittedly, providing a defense or mitigation for an indoctrinationinduced offense could undermine criminal law’s foundations if it means
having to constantly inquire into how an offender came to have the beliefs and
values that contributed to the offense. This danger becomes significantly
more acute once one appreciates that powerful forces of manipulation and
influence exist in a wide variety of common situations, not just in the extreme
and unusual case of POW brainwashing. It would be unworkable if the
criminal law now had to investigate how offenders came to hold their crimeinducing beliefs and values.
The Article has shown, however, that it is possible to define specific
liability criteria for an indoctrination defense/mitigation by which a decisionmaker can effectively identify the special indoctrination cases in which the
offender is truly blameless or has significantly reduced blameworthiness. We
suggest an analytic framework that focuses on five points of inquiry: Was the
offender in fact indoctrinated by another to adopt beliefs and values not his or
her own? Could the offender have reasonably been expected to have resisted
the indoctrination? Did the indoctrination cause the offense, or might the
offense have occurred even without the indoctrination? Should the offender
at some time prior to the offense have recovered from the indoctrination
effects on their own? And, faced with the decision to commit the offense,
could we reasonably have expected the offender to have resisted commission
despite the indoctrination? An offender who clears all of these hurdles
deserves a complete defense. Even an offender who clears most hurdles and
barely misses the second, fourth, or fifth hurdle, may deserve a significant
mitigation, such as a reduction of one offense grade.
It is true that recognizing a defense or formal mitigation for an
indoctrination-induced offense would break new ground in modern
foundations of criminal liability. It would be the first time in which a (sane)
263. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1962) (emphasis added).
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offender would not be held responsible for the beliefs and values that he holds.
However, this historic broadening of the criminal law’s liability principles
ought to be accepted if one sees value in imposing liability only on those who
deserve it and only in proportion to their blameworthiness, as both
retributivists and crime-control utilitarians ought to support.

